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1958] COMMENTS
When there is an appeal from a judgment in garnishment
proceedings, the garnishee is always a necessary party to the
appeal.842 Although the defendant is not a necessary party,348 he
has sufficient interest as a third person to appeal from a judg-
ment in the garnishment proceedings.844 When the defendant or
an intervening third party appeals from a judgment in garnish-
ment proceedings,3 45 both the garnishee and the plaintiff are
necessary parties.8 46
Since the garnishee is merely a stakeholder in the garnish-
ment proceedings, he cannot appeal to investigate the merits of
the judgment between the plaintiff and the defendant. 47 All the
garnishee has a right to complain of on appeal is the judgment
of the court insofar as it affects his interests. 48
Jesse D. McDonald*
Burrell J. Carter
Expropriation-A Survey of Louisiana Law
Eminent domain is the inherent right' of a sovereign to ac-
quire private property for a public purpose without the owner's
342. Katz & Barnett v. Sorsby, 34 La. Ann. 588 (1882) ; Reese & Ellis v. B.
Couvers & Co., 16 La. Ann. 39 (1861) ; Copley v. Snow, 3 La. Ann. 623 (1848).
343. Katz & Barnett v. Sorsby, 34 La. Ann. 588 (1882) ; Elder v. Rogers, 11
La. Ann. 606 (1856). If the defendant is cited to appear, and on appeal he asks
that the judgment be affirmed, he acknowledges that the original judgment is cor-
rect and the proceedings under the writ of fieri facias are regular so far as he is
concerned. Campbell v. Myers, 16 La. Ann. 362 (1861).
344. First National Bank v. Lagrone, 164 La. 907, 114 So. 832 (1927) ; Cop-
ley v. Snow, 3 La. Ann. 623 (1848). See, however, Citizens Bank v. Bringier, 22
La. Ann. 118 (1870).
345. Carman v. Anderson, 15 La. 136 (1840) (suspensive appeal by inter-
venors in the main demand did not suspend execution of judgment against gar-
nishees).
346. Copley v. Snow, 3 La. Ann. 623 (1848).
347. Hanna's Syndics v. Lauring, 10 Mart.(O.S.) 568 (La. 1822) ; Kimball v.
Plant, 14 La. 511 (1840).
348. See note 347 aupra.
*Now a Member of the Monroe Bar.
1. Two schools of thought exist concerning this attribute of the right. The
"natural law school" holds that eminent domain exists simply as another example
of the superior right of the state over private property. The second school pro-
poses that the right exists as a necessity of government. Both recognize that it
need not be constitutionally created. 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 13 (3d ed.
1950). In this particular see also JAHE, EMINENT DOMAIN 5 (1953) and 29 C.J.S.,
Eminent Domain § 2 (1941).
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consent, provided fair compensation is paid.2 The process by
which this power is exercised in Louisiana is expropriation. 8
While this power may be limited or defined by statutory pro-
visions or jurisprudential constructions, it is generally conceded
that it is not thereby created.4 Purported exercises of the police
power and the taxation power may be extended to confiscatory
limits so as to bring into application the rules relative to eminent
domain. Generally, however, the three powers are easily dis-
tinguished. All are elements of sovereignty ;i however, the power
of eminent domain is used to acquire property from the individ-
ual, while the police power only regulates and the taxing power
of necessity acts on groups as a whole as a means of acquiring
funds.7 Thus the safeguards, constitutional or otherwise, relative
2. Louisiana's constitutional provisions - LA CONST. arts. I, § 2, and IV,
§ 15- pretermit any consideration of whether the individual has as a reciprocal
right to the sovereign's right, an inherent right to compensation. There is au-
thority to the effect that he does. See 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 13 (3d ed.
1950) ; Grant, The Higher Law Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6
Wis. L. REV. 67 (1931).
3. The term expropriation is said to refer to Louisiana's requirement of previous
compensation before acquisition. Hammond, Expropriation in Louisiana, in 14
WEST's LA. R.S.A. 475 (1951). Thus, the acquisition of riparian land for road
or levee purposes is an appropriation of the land since no previous compensation
is required. Ruch v. New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 275, 283, 9 So. 473, 476 (1891) :
"This right of appropriation . . . is and was co-existent with the right of-expro-
priation. . . . [T]he two principles are of well-recognized and ancient origin -
one being an exercise of the police power, any loss sustained thereby entitling the
injured party to no recompense, the same being damnum absque injuria; the other
being the exertion of- the right of eminent domain, the damages entailed being
compensable."
No special consideration of appropriation of riparian land will be made in this
Comment. Such acquisition is generally considered an exercise of the police power.
Dubose v. Levee Comm'rs, 11 La. Ann. 165 (1859): "The law concerning the
expropriation of private property for public use does not apply to such lands upon
the banks of navigable rivers as may be found necessary for levee purposes. The
quantity of land to be taken for such purposes presents a question of police or
administration to be decided by the local authorities." See also Bass v. Louisiana,
34 La. Ann. 494, 496 (1882) : "This [regulation of property by the sovereign] is
very different from the right of eminent domain, which expropriates upon indem-
nity for public utility. It is the police power which is inherent to every govern-
ment under its organic law, and which is exercised without making compensation."
The Supreme Court of the United States has sustained Louisiana's position in re-
gard to riparian land. Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896). The constitu-
tional provision relating to recoverable value in the case of riparian lands is LA.
CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
4. See the authorities cited in note 1 supra.
5. Constituting what Jahr terms "the state's powerhouse." JAHR, EMINENT
DOMAIN 11 (1953).
6. Confusion more often exists as between the power of police and that of
eminent domain than between the taxing power and eminent domain. See 1
NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 70, § 1.42 (3d ed. 1950): "Under the police power
the property is not, as a general rule, appropriated to another use, but is destroyed
or its value impaired, while under the power of eminent domain it is transferred
to the state to be enjoyed and used as its own."
7. No benefits or compensation are returned to the one subject to the powers
of taxation and police other than those accruing to society as a whole as a result
of the administration of organized government.
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to eminent domain do not apply to exercises of the powers of tax-
ation" or police.9 The extent to which the sovereign may inter-
fere with the property interests of its citizens under the guise
of taxation or an exercise of the power of police before the rules
relative to eminent domain are applicable is beyond the purview
of this Comment.'0 Attention will here be directed to the situa-
tion of a formal expropriation suit, those situations where the
8. Excelsior Planting and Mfg. Co. v. Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 (1887)
(constitutional prohibitions against taking property except for public purpose with
previous compensation are not applicable to contributions levied under the taxing
power).
The imposition of special improvement assessments is not an exercise of the
power of taxation. City of Lafayette v. Tanner, 149 La. 430, 432, 89 So. 314
(1921) : "It is too well settled to require citation of authority that the require-
ments of article 225 of the Constiution [now LA. CONST. art. X, § 1, as amended],
that taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the territorial limits of the
authority levying the tax and that all property shall be taxed in proportion to its
value, have no application or reference to local assessments or forced contributions
imposed on the theory of special benefits." What the acquisition is called is of no
importance. There are certain elements which determine what is an assessment.
Excelsior Planting and Mfg. Co. v. Green, supra. Though termed an assessment,
if in reality the imposition is a tax it will have to be apportioned uniformly.
Municipality Number Two v. White, 9 La. Ann. 446 (1854). But before a prop-
erty may be assessed it must be benefitted to an equal or greater extent, otherwise
the assessment would be a taking of property without compensation. In re New
Orleans Draining Co., 11 La. Ann. 338 (1856) ; In re New Orleans, 20 La. Ann.
497 (1868). But see Donaldson's Heirs v. New Orleans, 166 La. 1059, 118 So.
134 (1928), where the assessment was for more than the lot was worth.
The taxing power may be contracted away with respect to a certain party, but
the power of eminent domain cannot. 1 NicHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 2-3, § 1.141
(3d ed. 1950).
9. See the language in New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Hart, 40 La. Ann. 474,
477, 4 So. 215, 217 (1888) : "That power, so far, [of police] has not received a
full and complete definition; but it may be said to be the right of a State, or of a
State functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, protection,
comfort and convenience of the community, which do not encroach on the like
power vested in Congress by the Federal Constitution. Of that power, it may well
be said, that it is known when and where it begins; but not when and where it
terminates. It is a power, in the exercise of which a man's property may be taken
from him, where his liberty may be shackled, and his person exposed to destruc-
tion, in cases of great public emergencies." See also Ruch v. New Orleans, 43 La.
Ann. 275, 283, 9 So. 473, 477 (1891) : "The provisions of the Constitution placing
restrictions upon the exercise of the power of expropriation [eminent domain]
have no reference to the police power of the State, or of a municipality in the
State. The latter is necessarily an inherent and reserved power of a State, and is
practically unlimited- and its exercise is subject to legislative control alone."
In one of the first such decisions in the country the court sustained a zoning
ordinance as an exercise of the police power and not a taking of property. State
er rel. Civello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923). See Bass v.
Louisiana, 34 La. Ann. 494 (1882). The exercise by the state of the riparian
servitude is said to be an exercise of the police power. See note 1 supra.
In the interesting case of McGeeham v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 165 La. 241,
115 So. 473 (1928), dirt was taken from land not subject to the riparian servitude
to repair a levee during an emergency without consent or previous compensation,
and the court held even though such was an exercise of the police power compensa-
tion was due to the owner.
10. Some instances where property interests are affected but not in such a
manner as to make applicable the provisions on eminent domain are presented In
the introductory article, Hammond, Expropriation in Louisiana, in 14 LA. Rv.
STAT. ANN. 475 (West 1951).
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taker enters and constructs improvements prior to suit," and
those cases where the "damaging" provision 12 of Article I, Sec-
tion 2, of the Constitution is applicable.
Terminology
For clearness, this Comment will employ various terms with
particular meanings as designated below. Any sovereign, sub-
division thereof, or corporation exercising the power of eminent
domain will be termed the taker. The person or persons from
whom the property is sought to be taken will be called the owner.
The term subject property13 will be used to refer to the physical
property taken or the property interests affected.
Basic Requirements of Expropriation
Before the owner may be required to transfer his property
to the taker several requirements must be met. These involve
inquiries with respect to the owner, the taker, the property, and
the proceedings. They may further be divided for the purposes of
analysis into the following categories: (1) the purpose of the
taking, (2) the necessity of the taking, (3) the authority of the
taker, (4) the procedure employed and the extent of compliance
therewith, (5) the previous payment of fair compensation, and
(6) the attempt to avoid litigation by a prior tender of value.
11. See text page 533 infra.
12. This provision extending compensation to a case of "damaging" as well as
one of a "taking" was first incorporated in the Constitution of 1879 in Article 156.
It was carried forward in the subsequent Constitutions of 1898 (Article 167) and
1913 (Article 167) into the present fundamental law. The leading case construing
this addition, which is also a landmark case in Louisiana expropriation law, is
McMahon v. The St. Louis, Ark. & Texas R.R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 6 So. 640 (1889),
reaffirmed in numerous cases. The McMahon case restricted the liberal indica-
tions evidenced in an earlier construction of the added provision which would have
covered more items as "damages." Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pac. R.R. v. Dillard,
35 La. Ann. 1045 (1883). The measure of damages is the diminution in market
value of the owner's property proximately caused by the construction or improve-
ment. Harrison v. Highway Comm., 191 La. 839, 186 So. 354 (1939). Article
2633 of the Civil Code did not expressly include "damaging." Britt v. Shreveport,
83 So.2d 476 (La. App. 1955).
13. Almost invariably the subject-property in all respects will be immovable
property. See LA. R.S. 19:1 (1950): "As used in this Part [Title 19], the term
'property' means immovable property, including servitudes." The source of this
provision, La. Acts 1948, No. 325, § 1, reads: "That the term 'property,' as used
in this Act, shall include corporeal property and also servitudes." This definition
was incorporated in the Special Highway Procedure (LA. R.S. 19:51, 48:441
(1950)), but probably no distinction was meant to be drawn from the coverage of
LA. R.S. 19:1 (1950). See also LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 2626 (1870). The owner
may be required to yield to the community "any particular property."
Louisiana v. Sauls, 99 So.2d 97 (La. 1958), refused compensation to an owner
for the "damages" suffered by his movables when he had to resell them at a loss.
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Public Purpose
Section 2 of Article I of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921
provides, inter alia, "Except as otherwise provided 14 in this Con-
stitution, private property shall not be taken or damaged except
for public purposes and after just and adequate compensation is
paid." (Emphasis added.) From this proviso comes the require-
ment that the taking must serve some public purpose ;15 expro-
priation for a private purpose will be unconstitutional. 16 The de-
termination of what constitutes a public purpose is a judicial
function. 17 The owner may always raise the question for consid-
eration by. the court and the Legislature cannot deprive him of
that right.'8 Even prior to 194819 when the jury trial was still
14. Notwithstanding this language, could a constitutional provision eliminate
the requirement of public purpose? It would appear that an attempted statutory
dispensation would be inoperative. See DeBouchel v. Highway Commission, 172
La. 908, 135 So. 914 (1931) (legislative attempt to empower highway commission
to acquire land prior to termination of expropriation suit and determination of
award held unconstitutional). But see Breaux v. Bienvenu, 51 La. Ann. 687, 25
So. 321 (1899), where plaintiff, contending he was enclosed, sought to apply Act
54 of 1896 and construct a tramway over his neighbor's land. Finding no necessity
the court said it thus did not have to decide whether the legislature could authorize
a private exproporation for private purposes. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 699-703
(1870). Under Article 699 compensation must be paid, but not under Article 701.
Is this expropriation for a private use? See 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 428
(3d ed. 1950) : "The inhibition of the fifth amendment [of the Federal Constitu-
tion] forbids the taking of private property for private purposes."
15. See Port Comm. v. Morley, 232 La. 87, 93 So.2d 912 (1957) (public pur-
pose which was to convey to the federal government was sustained on the basis
of Article IV, Section 12, of the Constitution which says the state or a subdivision
thereof may acquire property and donate or otherwise convey it to the United
States for certain enumerated "public purposes") ; Calcasieu & S. Ry. v. Bel, 224
La. 269, 273, 69 So.2d 40, 41 (1953) ("It is the duty of the court in this case ...
to decide on the facts presented whether the taking is for a public purpose or
use"); New Orleans v. New Orleans Land Co., 173 La. 71, 75, 136 So. 91, 93
(1931) ("Our conception of the law is that where the state or a municipality seeks
to acquire property by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the primary
question is whether or not the taking is for the public use"); River & Rail
Terminals Inc. v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 171 La. 223, 130 So. 337 (1930);
New Orleans v. Moeglich, 169 La. 1111, 126 So. 675 (1930) ; Louisiana Nay. &
Fisheries Co. v. Doullut, 114 La. 906, 911, 38 So. 613, 615 (1905) ("Under our
laws private individuals cannot exercise the power of eminent domain") ; Kansas
City S. & G. Ry. v. Vickburg, S. & P. By., 49 La. Ann. 29, 21 So. 144 (1896) ;
Williams v. Judge, 45 La. Ann. 1295, 14 So. 57 (1893) ; Gulf States Utilities Co.
v. Callahan, 65 So.2d 608 (La. App. 1953).
16. Calcasieu & S. By. v. Bel, 224 La. 269, 276, 69 So.2d 40, 42 (1953) ("For
a constitutional application of the article [LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2630 (1870)]
the taking of the property by the plaintiff must be for a public purpose and utility
as provided in the Constitution") ; New Orleans v. Moeglich, 169 La. 1111, 1116,
126 So. 675, 677 (1930) ("expropriation beyond the public interest and necessity
would obviously be unconstitutional").
17. See Calcasieu & S. Ry. v. Bel, 224 La. 269, 274, 69 So.2d 40, 41 (1953)
("strictly a judicial function") ; Kansas City S. & G. Ry. v. Meyer, 166 La. 663,
117 So. 765 (1928) ; Williams v. Judge, 45 La. Ann. 1295, 1297, 14 So. 57, 59(1893) ("what constitutes public utility and public purposes is for the courts to
determine").
18. New Orleans Terminal Co. v. Teller, 113 La. 733, 744, 37 So. 624, 628
(1904) ("in defense to the expropriation suit [the owner], can, as a matter of
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permissible in expropriation suits2° and their verdict held great
weight, the select panel of landowners could not pass on this
question. In articulating this requirement of public as contra-
distinguished from private employment of the subject property,
the authorities use two modes, and selection of either involves
considerations of policy concerning the extension of the scope of
permissible expropriation. These modes are "public use" or
actual use by the public and "public benefit" or allocation to a
use resulting in advantages to the public at large.21 The former
relates to actual use by the public after it has been applied to its
designated purpose. There the use should be one of right and
not one of privilege. It is at once obvious that such a standard
is a very demanding one, since in nearly every other allocation of
funds and property which the sovereign makes, the public is not
by right entitled to actual physical participation therein.22 Many
of the destined uses direct the property into channels which of
necessity require the exclusion of the general public. 28 To re-
strict the doctrine of eminent domain to the actual use concept
would deprive the power of a great deal of its utility. It is thus
apparent that the better standard to be employed is that of "pub-
lic benefit" or "public advantage." Phrased in such a manner,
the rule is more consonant with reality and provides a more
workable basis for judicial measurement. Also it is more in line
with Louisiana's requirement of acquisition for "public pur-
poses. ' 2 4
Despite some restrictive language in the case of River & Rail
Terminal Co. v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co.,25 Louisiana has ap-
course, raise the question as to whether the purpose of the, taking is public ...
Of this Constitution-given right the Legislature would be powerless to deprive
him").
19. The jury trial in expropriation cases was abolished in La. Acts 1948, No.
325, § 2, incorporated in LA. R.S. 19:4 (1950).
20. It could be waived by stipulation of the parties. American T. & T. Co. v.
Maguire, 219 La. 740, 54 So.2d 4 (1951).
21. The two concepts are set out at 2 NIcHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.2 (3d
ed. 1950). See JAHE, EMINENT DOMAIN 23 (1953), who groups public uses into
the general classes of administration, communication, travel, navigation, public
health, education, and miscellaneous.
22. Thus the latter concept is more consonant with the scope enjoyed by the
other powers of police and taxation. See 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 434, n. 27
(3d ed. 1950), and cases cited thereunder.
23. Such as governmental agency housing, restricted areas of research, and
slum clearance projects. All such uses have been sustained by the courts.
24. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2. See LA. R.S. 48:447, 460 (1950). Cf. LA. CONST.
art. IV, § 15: "[N]or shall vested rights be divested, unless for purposes of public
utility."
25. 171 La. 223, 233, 130 So. 337, 340 (1930) : "It is well settled that there
must be a general public right to a definite use of the property, as distinguished
from a use by private individual or corporation which may prove beneficial or
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parently adopted the "benefit theory, '26 for in a subsequent case27
the court held the taking to be for a public purpose, although it
appeared that the taker's objective was to serve a privately
owned sand and gravel company by a railroad constructed on the
expropriated property.28  Further, this state has accepted as
proper public purposes such applications of expropriated land as
servicing a private ice plant and planing mill,29 providing a site
for an auditorium, 80 a donation by the state to the federal gov-
ernment,3' land development projects,8 2 spur tracks,83 and even
housing developments.8 4 Perhaps the most extreme illustration
of the extent of an acceptable "public purpose" is to be found
in the slum clearance cases, where it has been held that private
property may be expropriated and directed to private use or even
private ownership. 5 It is submitted that here the power of emi-
nent domain takes on connotations of the police power, and the
opinions sustaining such an exercise of mixed powers contain
discussion along conventional police power lines.8 6 Such projects
are generally undertaken by agencies of the state. It is impor-
tant to note that where the declaration of public purpose is made
by a taker who is the sovereign or a subdivision thereof, the dec-
laration will not be overturned by the court as readily as where
it is made by a private association.8 7
profitable to some portion of the public."
26. In New Orleans v. New Orleans Land Co., 173 La. 71, 136 So. 91 (1931),
the court, in an extract from Corpusa Juris, considers the two concepts -use and
benefit -and apparently approves the latter over the actual use theory.
27. Calcasieu & S. Ry. v. Bel, 224 La. 269, 69 So.2d 40 (1953). This was an
extremely unusual case, as the award was not at issue on the appeal, only the
taker's right to expropriate was contested. Thus the public purpose -issue was
squarely presented to the court.
28. It is hard to envision how the public could therefore "use" the acquired
property.
29. Tremont & Gulf Ry. v. Louisiana & A. Ry., 128 La. 299, 54 So. 826 (1911).
30. New Orleans v. Salvatore, 167 La. 891, 120 So. 587 (1929).
31. Jefferson Parish v. Texas Co., 192 La. 934, 189 So. 580 (1939); Lough-
ridge v. Parish of Iberia, 180 La. 875, 158 So. 3 (1934) ; Shreveport v. Pedro,
170 La. 351, 127 So. 865 (1930).
32. New Orleans Land Co. v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 171 La. 718, 132 So.
121 (1930).
33. Gumbel v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 186 La. 882, 173 So. 518 (1937)
Webster Sand, Gravel & Construction Co. v. Vicksburg S. & P. Ry., 129 La. 1096,
57 So. 529 (1912) ; Louisiana & A. Ry. v. Louisiana Ry. & Navigation Co., 125
La. 756, 51 So. 712 (1910). A railroad may exercise the power of eminent domain
even though it carries only freight and no passengers. Vicksburg A. & S. By. v.
Louisiana & A. Ry., 136 La. 691, 67 So. 553 (1915).
34. State ex -rel. Porterie v. Housing Authority, 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725
(1938).
.35. Housing Authority v. Gondolfo, 208 La. 1065, 24 So.2d 78 (1945) ; State
ex rel. Porterie v. Housing Authority, 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725 (1938).
36. See note 35 supra.
37. New Orleans v. New Orleans Land Co., 173 La. 71, 136 So. 91 (1931).
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Necessity
Closely related to and often confused 8 with the element of
public purpose is the requirement of necessity.3 9 It is true that
in one sense the two are the same, for if a taking is not for a
public purpose, it is not necessary. But the contrary is not true
and, even though property is sought to be acquired for a public
purpose, that does not automatically mean that it is necessary. 40
38. An example of this will be seen in Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Callahan,
65 So.2d 608, 611 (La. App. 1953), where it is said: "Appellant has clearly shown
that the immediate necessity [purpose] for the construction of the line is to serve
the Erath pumping station."
In Parish of Jefferson v. Texas Co., 192 La. 934, 189 So. 580 (1939), the
plaintiff expropriated from the owner in order to donate the acquisition to the
federal government for the Barataria Bay waterway. Minerals being discovered
in the vicinity, the owner pressed a claim alleging that plaintiff had acquired
only a servitude and not the fee (perfect ownership). Plaintiff sued to clear his
title. The court found the parish had expropriated the full fee, but had donated
to the federal government only a servitude, thus the minerals beneath the subject
property inured to the benefit of the parish. Even if such acquisition was erro-
neous, continued the court, the defendants were bound by the judgment, since their
ancestor in title acquiesced therein by accepting the benefits adjudged to them.
Justice Odom, joined by Chief Justice O'Niell and Justice Land, dissented, ground-
ing his argument in part on the proposition that the acquisition of the fee was for
no 'public purpose."
It is in cases such as these that the assertion is made that the acquisition Is
not necessary to the public purpose. It is submitted that a better analysis of the
problem thus posed will be achieved if it is considered in terms of the extent of
the interest involved and not in terms of the purpose to which the interest will be
allocated. If a contrary approach is used, it will produce such propositions as
that stated in New Orleans v. Crawford, 9 So.2d 82, 84 (La. App. 1942): "If
the purpose to be accomplished is true, then the question of the necessity is solved
in favor of the right to expropriate."
39. "If any owner shall be of opinion that the quantity of land sought to be
purchased by any corporation exceeds that which is reasonably necessary for the
purpose intended by the company, it shall be lawful for him to file a special plea,
setting forth this fact, and in such case the jury [the judge] shall determine not
only the value of the land to be expropriated, but also the extent of land over
which the company may exercise the forced expropriation; the whole always sub-ject to the decision of the Supreme Court on appeal." (Emphasis added.) LA.
CIVIL CODE art. 2636 (1870).
In over 450 Louisiana cases analyzed there were only five conclusively stopping
expropriation by a certain taker and they involved lack of necessity: Texas & P.
Ry. v. W. K. Henderson Iron Wks. & Supply Co., 125 La. 371, 51 So. 294 (1910)
(mere inconvenience to the taker not sufficient warrant for expropriation).; Lou-
isiana & N.W. Ry. v. Vicksburg S. & P. Ry., 112 La. 915, 36 So. 803 (1904)
(subject property was just as necessary to owner as to taker) ; Lecoul v. Police
Jury, 20 La. Ann. 308 (1868) (perpetual injunction granted against taker) ; Jef-
ferson & Pontchartrain R.R. v. Thomas Hazeur & Co., 7 La. Ann. 182 (1852)
(court on its own motion noticed railroad possessed all the land it needed);
Holmes v. T. & P. Ry., 11 La. App. 578 (1929) (railroad did not need section
house). I
Other select cases are School Bd. v. Clark, 197 La. 131, 1 So.2d 54 (i941)
Shreveport v. Kansas City S. & G. Ry., 169 La. 1085, 126 So. 667 (1930) ; New
Orleans v. Moeglich, 169 La. 1111, 126 So. 675 (1930) ; Louisiana Ry. & Nay.
Co. v. Xavier Realty Ltd., 115 La. 328, 39 So. 1 (1905) ; Levee Comm'rs v. Jack-
son's Estate, 113 La. 124, 36 So. 912 (1904) ; Bayou Cook Nay. & Fisheries Co.
v. Doullut, 111 La. 517, 35 So. 729 (1904) ; Kansas City S. & G. Ry. v. Vicks-
burg S. & P. R.R., 49 La. Ann. 29, 21 So. 144 (1896).
40. See the cases cited in note 59 infra. There the public purpose is a valid
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The concept of necessity concedes that the property is being
taken for a public purpose. It interjects into the requirements
of a valid expropriation a further element relating to the pur-
pose of the acquisition. In this respect it may be explained as an
extension of the inquiry relating to an evaluation of the purpose
to which the subject property will be applied.
The initial determination of the extent of property sought to
be expropriated necessarily is a matter within the discretion of
the taker,41 but it is subject to review as a judicial42 question of
fact.48 The lower courts' findings in this respect will not be
lightly overturned.4 4 If contested 45 the burden of establishing
proof of the necessity is on the taker,46 but if nothing is said
about necessity, the fact that the court renders an opinion sus-
taining the expropriation shows that the judge found it neces-
sary.47 If no proof is brought forward and it is apparent that
there exists no necessity, the court may notice this on its own
one, but there is no necessity for the quality of the interest asked for.
41. Port Comm'r v. Watson, 224 La. 136, 68 So.2d 901 (1953), and cases cited
therein.
42. Westwego v. Marrero Land & Imp. Ass'n Ltd., 221 La. 564, 59 So.2d 885
(1952) ; School Board v. Clark, 197 La. 131, 1 So.2d 54 (1941) ; Shreveport v.
Kansas City S. & G. Ry., 169 La. 1085, 1087, 126 So. 667 (1930) ("The question
of the expediency or necessity for the expropriation is a question that should be
determined by the courts and not by juries of freeholders").
In New Orleans v. Moeglich, 169 La. 1111, 1114, 126 So. 675, 677 (1930), the
court said: "Whether that question [of necessity] should have been tried and
determined by the trial judge, leaving the question of value and damage for the
jury which under the Code is to be impaneled to assess the value of the land, is of
no importance now, since the court approved the finding of the jury both as to
necessity and valuation."
43. Westwego v. Marrero Land & Imp. Ass'n Ltd., 221 La. 564, 59 So.2d 885
(1952) ; New Orleans Pacific Co. v. Gay, 31 La. Ann. 430 (1879) and again in the
same case in 32 La. Ann. 471 (1880).
44. Westwego v. Marrero Land & Imp. Ass'n Ltd., 221 La. 564, 568, 59 So.2d
885, 886 (1952): "While the expediency or necessity of an expropriation is a
matter for judicial determination . . . nevertheless, the suitability of the property
sought to be expropriated for the purpose as stated is primarily a question of fact,
on which the judgment of the district court will not be disturbed unless manifestly
erroneous, and particularly when that judgment has constituted an affirmation of
the determination of the expropriating authority, arrived at after due, impartial
consideration."
45. As was the case with the requirement of public purpose the owner may
raise the issue of necessity. LA. CivrL CODE art. 2636 (1870) ; New Orleans V.
Moeglich, 169 La. 1111, 126 So. 675 (1930) ; Kansas City, S. & G. Ry. v. Meyer,
166 La. 663, 117 So. 765 (1928); Levee Comm'rs v. Jackson's Estate, 113 La.
124, 36 So. 912 (1904).
46. John T. More Planting Co. v. Morgans La. & T.R. & S.S. Co., 126 La. 840,
53 So. 22 (1910) ; Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Xavier Realty Ltd., 115 La. 328,
340, 39 So. 1, 5 (1905) ("[A taker] seeking to expropriate the property of a
citizen assumes the burden of proving the necessity in the particular case for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, and . . . failing to establish that fact, It
should take nothing by its demand"). The court noticed plaintiff had proved the
necessity in Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 85 So.2d 260 (1956).
47. School Board v. Clark, 197 La. 131, 1 So.2d 54 (1941).
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motion and deny the expropriation. 48 Present necessity, how-
ever, is not required; it is sufficient if future necessity is found. 49
Considerations of necessity may be divided into three pos-
sible situations, often confused with one another. In the first
the ultimate objective may not be necessary in the sense that it
is not presently needed. 50 Where the sovereign or a subdivision
or agency thereof is the taker, this aspect of necessity is peculiar-
ly within their discretion.5 Once they have designated the ob-
jective, it is beyond the power of the court to question either the
appropriateness or propriety of this; but where the taker is a
private corporation, the attempted acquisition may well be sub-
ject to such an objection.
In the second situation, the proposed objective may be very
necessary, but the property sought may not be necessary to its
realization.52 If this is found to be the case, the owner has a valid
and conclusive defense. 53 This situation, however, should not be
confused with the determination of the proper location of the
acquisition. It can never be a defense to an owner that another's
property could just as adequately serve the purposes of the
taker.54 If the property is necessary in order that the objective
48. Jefferson & Pontchartrain R.R. v. Thomas Hazeur & Co., 7 La. Ann. 182
(1852). There was some authority to the effect that if no issue were raised as to
the quality of the interest sought to be expropriated "the legal presumption [was]
that the full owner8hip is necessary to a corporation having perpetual existence,
and that if it is not necessary, the onus of showing it is on the defendant, who
should specially plead it." (Emphasis added.) New Orleans Pac. By. v. Gay,
31 La. Ann. 430, 432 (1879). This was later restricted by the following language:
"in the absence of allegation and proof that the fee is unnecessary, the court should
award the fee where the party seeking the expropriation is chartered to maintain
a public work in perpetuity." New Orleans Pac. Ry. v. Gay, 32 La. Ann. 471,
475 (1880). It was properly criticized in John T. More Planting Co. v. Morgans
La. T.R. & S.S. Co., 126 La. 840, 874, 53 So. 22, 33 (1910) : "The perpetuity,
vel non of the charter of the [taker] is not determinative of the necessity, vel non,
of taking the fee. . . . There is no reason why a railroad, because it is perpetual,
should be given the mineral and other subsoil rights when it can have need of
surface rights only." But apparently it was reinstated by Knox v. Louisiana Ry.
& Nay. Co., 157 La. 602, 102 So. 685 (1925), although here the reasoning is ques-
tionable.
49. New Orleans v. Moeglich, 169 La. 1111, 126 So. 675 (1930). See LA.
R.S. 48:220, 442(2) (1950) (width of highway right of way may be determined
by the chief engineer so as to provide for the public interest in the future as well
as the present). See also State v. Cooper, 213 La. 1016, 36 So.2d 22 (1948).
50. See the cases cited in note 57 infra.
51. New Orleans v. Steinhardt, 52 La. Ann. 1043, 27 So. 586 (1900).
52. See the cases cited in note 39 supra, where expropriation was conclusively
stopped.
53. Ibid.
54. Orleans & J. Ry. v. Jefferson & L.;P. Ry., 51 La. Ann. 1605, 1619, 26 So.
M78. 280 '1899) : "If one proprietor could defeat the expropriation on the ground
"hat the call should be made on another, the supposed compulsion of the law re.
•iring private property for the public good would be of no efficacy."
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be achieved, the owner cannot be heard to urge that the acqui-
sition be made elsewhere, for the selection of the site is a matter
of discretion vested in the taker whether it be the state, a sub-
division thereof, or a corporation so long as it acts reasonably. 5
It is submitted that in the situation where a power company
seeks to acquire a servitude for its lines, the court should be more
liberal to the owner in its attitude respecting the proposed loca-
tion. In such a case a slight change in location may decrease the
injury done to the owner without appreciably increasing the cost
to the taker.56
The third situation where a necessity problem arises is where
the property interest sought by the taker is in excess of that
which will adequately serve his needs. Seldom does this situa-
tion arise in respect to extent.57 So long as the taker does not
exercise his discretion in an arbitrary manner, the determination
of the extent of the acquisition is left to him.58 However, where
the legal quality of the interest sought is in excess of that qual-
ity needed, the court will step in and limit the taker. An example
of this is where the taker is a transportation, communication, or
power company seeking perfect ownership of the owner's land
for the purpose of merely crossing it. Here a servitude would be
fully sufficient and the taker is limited to that.59
55. Port Comm. v. Watson, 224 La. 136, 68 So.2d 901 (1953) ; Westwego v.
Marrero Land & Imp. Ass'n, 221 La. 564, 59 So.2d 885 (1952) ; Highway Comm.
v. Hay's Heirs, 186 La. 398, 172 So. 432 (1937) ; Gretna v. Brooklyn Land Co.,
182 La. 543, 162 So. 70 (1935) ; Louisiana & A. Ry. v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay.
Co., 125 La. 756, 51 So. 712 (1910) ; Fuselier v. Police Jury, 109 La. 551, 83
So. 597 (1903). Prior to 1948 the jury could not determine the route to be taken.
New Orleans & Pac. R.R. v. Robertson, 34 La. Ann. 865 (1882). See also High-
way Comm. v. Treadway, 173 So. 209 (La. App. 1937), and cases there cited. But
in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Dileo, 79 So.2d 150 (La. App. 1955), the court
mentioned that the defense of "alternative location" had been waived by the de-
fendant's failure to file within 10 days under LA. R.S. 19:7 (1950).
The same rule is applicable in the appropriation for levee use situations. Board
of Comm'rs v. Franklin, 219 La. 859, 54 So.2d 125 (1951) ; Board of Comm'rs v.
Jackson's Estate, 113 La. 124, 36 So. 912 (1904).
56. In such a case the public utility taker will be in a position, through its rate
base procedure of adjusting income, to pass the cost of the acquisition on to Its
ultimate consumers. Such a result is more equitable than forcing the landowner
to bear the cost due to the injury of a straight line by himself.
57. Some instances, however, are Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191,
85 So.2d 260 (1956) (servitude of sixty feet asked for, reduced by the court to
thirty feet when plaintiff conceded in oral argument that thirty would be enough) ;
Levee Comm'rs v. Jackson's Estate, 113 La. 124, 36 So. 912 (1904) (defendant
said to be able to contest the necessity of the taking as well as the extent of the
taking) ; Bayou Cook Nay. & Fisheries Co. v. Doullut, 111 La. 517, 35 So. 729
(1904).
58. Port Comm. v. Watson, 224 La. 136, 68 So.2d 901 (1953). Essentially the
same position is taken here as in the determination of the site or location of the
improvement. See note 55 supra.
59. John T. More Planting Co. v. Morgans La. & T.R. & S.S. Co., 126 La.
840, 53 So. 22 (1910) ; Shreveport & R.R. Val. Ry. v. Hinds, 50 La. Ann. 781,
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It is to the owner's benefit to press vigorously this third
aspect of necessity. If only a servitude is acquired and the sub-
ject property is later abandoned or devoted to a non-public pur-
pose, it reverts to the owner.60 This would not be the case where
perfect ownership has passed.6 1 Insofar as the money award is
concerned, the owner need not fear that by objecting to the acqui-
sition in perfect ownership he will receive less compensation, for
the later cases indicate that the court will draw no difference in
the valuation of a servitude or perfect ownership if there is a real
interference with the owner's rights.6 2
24 So. 287 (1898) ; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Louisiana Western R.R., 49 La. Ann.
1270, 22 So. 219 (1897).
60. Louisiana & A. Ry. v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 127 La. 587, 53 So. 872
(1910) ; Shreveport & R.R. Val. Ry. v. Hinds, 50 La. Ann. 781, 788, 24 So. 287,
290 (1898) : "This right of way, servitude, or easement over the lands of defend-
ant's plantation is to endure so long as utilized for railway purposes, so long as a
railway track is laid there and operated by plaintiff company, or its successors
or assigns. When the strip of ground which is the subject of this expropriation
ceases to be used for this purpose, it will revert to the owner of the plantation."
See McCormick v. Louisiana & N.W. Ry., 109 La. 764, 33 So. 762 (1903). In
Hoggatt v. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pac. R.R., 34 La. Ann. 624 (1882), plaintiff
sued for damages alleging the subject property had been diverted from the public
purpose. The court found no such diversion as to predicate damages.
But see Knox v. Louisiana Ry & Nay. Co., 157 La. 602, 102 So. 685 (1925),
where apparently the court would have applied the 10 year non-user prescription
had it not been found that defendant had acquired the fee or perfect ownership.
61. Maguire v. Police Jury, 197 La. 247, 250, 1 So.2d 92, 93 (1941). Sustain-
ing an exception of no cause of action and citing from Corpus Juris: "When land
has been acquired for the public use in fee . . . either by the exercise of eminent
domain or by purchase, the former owners retain no rights in the land, and the
public use may be abandoned or the land devoted to a different use without any
impairment of the estate acquired or any reversion to the former owners."
62. Legally there is a difference. Jefferson v. Texas Co., 192 La. 934, 189 So.
580 (1939). But the recent cases have detected the fact that as to the owner his
loss may be the same whether a servitude or a perfect ownership is expropriated.
Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 205, 85 So.2d 260, 265 (1956) (The
following language was not affected by either of the two subsequent rehearings:
"there is not much difference between the value of the right of way or servitude
and the land embraced in it") ; Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Simmons, 229
La. 165, 178, 85 So.2d 251, 256 (1956) ("for all practical purposes there is no
difference between the value of the servitude and the value of the fee as to these
three tracts") ; Department of Highways v. Glassell, 226 La. 988, 77 So.2d 881
(1955) (answering state's contention that full value should not be awarded, the
court said the property would be damaged 100 percent by the servitude and so
gave full value) ; Texas Pipe Line Co. v. National Gas Co., 203 La. 787, 14 So.2d
636 (1943) (rights granted to the plaintiff in the tract virtually excluded the de-
fendant from any use or benefit therein) ; Police Jury v. Borne, 198 La. 959, 5
So.2d 301 (1941) (naked title and reversionary interest of little value to owner).
See Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Johnson, 223 La. 380, 65 So.2d 884 (1953) (award for
servitude was 1/3 market value of land, but owner's rights to enjoy the property
subject to the servitude were reserved). The courts have here not yet noticed that
if only a servitude is taken the owner retains valuable mineral rights.
The language of the earlier cases should no longer be controlling unless the
acquisition fails to interfere materially with the owner's rights. See as examples
of these earlier cases Shreveport v. Kansas City S. & G. Ry., 184 La. 473, 489,
166 So. 471, 477 (1936) ("The city is not attempting to expropriate the property
in fee, but is seeking a servitude of right of way over it. There is considerable
distinction between the two propositions. The ownership or right to the property
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Authority of the Taker
In expropriating, the taker in effect is either directly or in-
directly exercising the delegated power or right of the sovereign.
Thus, acting through the legislature, the sovereign may pass its
power on.3 The main authorization relative to the capacity of
the taker in Louisiana is set out in the Revised Statutes of 1950.64
However, the title of the act chartering the corporation need not
expressly state that the company has the right to expropriate. 65
It is the purpose for which the corporation is created66 that is de-
terminative.6 7
Thus, in cases of disagreement with the owner over the price
to be paid,68 needed property may be expropriated by the state or
in fee is certainly more valuable than the servitude or right of way over it") ;
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Louisiana W. Ry., 49 La. Ann. 1270, 1278, 22 So. 219, 221
(1897) ("The compensation to which defendants are entitled for the use and oc-
cupation of a portion of their right of way would vary materially ... from what
it would be entitled to if these proceedings were to carry with them to plaintiffs
the fee of any portion of defendants' right of way").
63. But never beyond recall. 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 3, § 1.141 (3d ed.
1950). See Bass v. Louisiana, 34 La. Ann. 494, 499 (1882): "The powers which
the State possesses necessarily must be exercised by agents, and are transmissible
to them by the State. Where therefore, the State has the legal right to undertake
a public -work . . . the State has the right, as a corollary, of delegating the power
to agents, who then are clothed with the necessary incidental authority to do that
which the State herself primarily had the right of doing."
64. LA. R.S. 19:2 (1950). See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2630 (1870). Rapides
Central Ry. v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 25 So.2d 828 (La. App. 1946).
The codal provisions have not been completely supplanted by the Revised
Statutes of 1950. However, Articles 2631 and 2632 are no longer operative. LA.
R.S. 19:4 (1950).
65. Mississippi, Terre-Aux-Boeufs & Lake Borgne R.R. v. Wooten, 36 La. Ann.
441 (1884). But it may be fatally defective in that it states power to serve a
private purpose. Bayou Cook Nay. & Fisheries Co. v. Doullut, 111 La. 517, 35
So. 729 (1904). Nor is it required that the Public Service Commission pass on
the common carrier status 6f a railroad before it can expropriate. Calcasieu &
S. Ry. v. Bel, 224 La. 269, 69 So.2d 40 (1953).
66. Plaintiff-taker may have to prove its corporate existence. Cumberland Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. St. Louis, 1 M. & S. Ry., 117 La. 199, 201, 41 So. 492, 493 (1906)
("foreign corporations, as well as corporations in other states, must prove that they
have legal corporate existence in the state in which they are organized"). And the
case may be remanded to determine if the corporation has complied with the laws
of its domicile. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Morgan's La. & T.R. & S.S. Co.,
112 La. 287, 36 So. 352 (1904).
67. Thus, the purpose must not be private. Louisiana Nay. & Fisheries Co. v.
Doullut, 114 La. 906, 911, 38 So. 613, 615 (1905) : "Under our laws private indi-
viduals cannot exercise the power of eminent domain .... We do not think it would
be a reasonable construction to hold that the same sovereign which has refused to
accord to the natural person the use of the power of eminent domain has consented
to accord it to an artificial person, qualified like the natural person to engage
in business of a purely private character."
68. There must be a prior tender. Otherwise an exception of prematurity if
filed in limine will be sustained and the suit dismissed. LA. R.S. 9:2 (1950) ; LA.
CIVIL CODE art. 2627 (1870). Calcasieu & So. Ry. v. Witte, 224 La. 1091, 71 So.2d
854 (1954). Although the demand was here made by a corporation, this rule
should be applicable as well to the state, its political corporations, or subdivisions.
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its political corporations or subdivisions69 created for the pur-
pose of exercising any state or governmental powers;70 or any
domestic or foreign corporation created for the construction of
non-local transportation facilities71 or federal expositions7 2 or
water or sewer works, 73 or those created to supply or market
gas7 4 or electricity 75 or transmit telegraphic intelligence ;76 or any
domestic corporation created for the construction and operation
of local transportation facilities,77 or to serve educational or char-
itable purposes. 78 Although the owner may at any stage of the
suit challenge the taker's right to expropriate,79 where the taker
seeking to expropriate is a subdivision" or agency8' of the state,
the owner may concede the right and capacity to expropriate,
thus limiting the case to one of valuation.
Property Subject to Expropriation
Almost any type of property may be expropriated whether
public8 2 or private, or whether used by the living8" or occupied
by the dead.8 4 Even expropriated property may be expropriated
a second time if the first use has been abandoned or if the second
use will not interfere with the first.8 5 Federal property cannot
69. A special procedure is provided for acquisition for highway purposes by the
State Highway Department (LA. R.S. 19:51-66 (1950)) and for acquisition of
some public utilities by municipalities (LA. R.S. 19:101-107 (1950)).
70. LA. R.S. 19:2(1) (1950).
71. Id. 19:2(3).
72. Id. 19:2(5).
73. Id. 19:2(6).
74. Id. 19:2(7).
75. Id. 19:2(9).
76. Id. 19:2(8).
77. Id. 19:2(2).
78. Id. 19:2(4).
79. And it is not waived by failure to answer the plaintiff in ten days as in-
dicated by LA. R.S. 9:7 (1950) : " [O]therwise a failure to comply with statutory
pleading might give an unconstitutional right of eminent domain to a private cor-
poration for a private purpose." City of Gretna v. Mitchell, 64 So.2d 873, 874
(La. App. 1953).
80. Shreveport v. Abe Meyer Corp., 219 La. 128, 52 So.2d 445 (1951) ; New
Orleans v. Noto, 217 La. 657, 47 So.2d 36 (1950) ; Shreveport v. Herndon, 173
La. 144, 136 So. 297 (1931).
81. Highway Comm. v. Barbe, 209 La. 185, 24 So.2d 372 (1946); Housing
Authority v. Gondolfo, 208 La. 1065, 24 So.2d 78 (1945) ; Housing Authority v.
Harkey, 200 La. 526, 8 So.2d 528 (1942).
82. Authorized use by the authorities may dispense with the necessity of an
expropriation suit or compensation to the grantee or to adjoining landowners. See
Harrison v. New Orleans Pac. Ry., 34 La. Ann. 462 (1882).
83. See LA. CiviL CODE art. 2637 (1870) and Louisiana & N.W. R.R. v. Nelson,
128 La. 390, 54 So. 917 (1911) (part of yard taken).
84. For "We cannot allow any determent of expansion by a beating of the
living with the bones of the dead." New Orleans v. Christ Church Corp., 228 La.
184, 201, 81 So.2d 855, 861 (1955) (graveyard taken).
85. "There is no question that . . .eminent domain extends to property already
expropriated. When that purpose is announced, it is simply the expression of the
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be expropriated by the state, but state property may be taken by
the federal government.s0 Property owned by one state, but sit-
uated in another, is subject to expropriation by the state of situs
as if it were private property.8 7 Acquisition in any situation,
however, need not be permanent and may be only temporary in
nature.s8
Procedures9
General procedure. A general taker in expropriation, such as
those mentioned above, 90 proceeds under the procedure set forth
in the first part of Title 19 of the Revised Statutes. Suit is filed
in the district court of the parish where the subject property is
wholly located, 91 or if the property is located in two or more par-
ishes, in that parish which is also the domicile of the defendant.92
If the defendant does not have his domicile in any parish where
part of the property is located, suit may be brought at the elec-
tion of the taker in any parish where part of the property is sit-
uated, and that court shall have jurisdiction over the entire
property.9 3 Plaintiff's petition must contain a statement of the
purposes for which the property is to be taken, a description
thereof including any immovables situated on the property and
the name of the owner, if known and present in the state.9 4 After
legislative judgment that the last public use last proposed is of greater impor-
tance than that to which the property is at the time devoted." Kansas City S. &
G. Ry. v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 49 La. Ann. 29, 33, 21 So. 144, 146 (1896),
where the two uses conflicted.
It will make a difference as to who is the taker and who is the owner. A
state-taker may acquire from a corporate-owner, but express authority may be
necessary for a corporate-taker to acquire from a corporate-owner. See JAR,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 20 (1953). See also Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Louisiana W.
R.R., 49 La. Ann. 1270, 22 So. 219 (1897) (servitude acquired expropriated from
another servitude).
The first servitude holder on the property cannot consent to an imposition of a
subsequent servitude. The owner must consent or be sued. See Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. Dileo, 79 So.2d 150 (La. App. 1955).
86. See JARa, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 21, 22 (1953).
87. 1 NIcHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.112(1) (3d ed. 1950).
88. See Department of Highways v. Glassell, 226 La. 988, 77 So.2d 881 (1955).
89. Since expropriation statutes are in derogation of a common right they will
be strictly construed. Any deviation or omission from the prescribed procedure
will generally invalidate that specific application but will not prevent a subsequent
application in proper form. See Tolmas v. Police Jury, 231 La. 1, 90 So.2d 65
(1956) ; Orleans-Kenner Electric Ry. Co. v. Metairie Ridge Nursery Inc., 136
La. 968, 68 So. 93 (1915); In re Municipality Number Two, 7 La. Ann. 76
(1852) ; In re Exchange Alley, 4 La. Ann. 4 (1849).
90. See page 521 supra.
91. LA. R.S. 19:2.1 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1950, No. 238, § 1.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid. It should conclude with a prayer that the property be adjudicated
to the plaintiff upon payment to the owner of all damages that he suffers. See
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date for trial is set by the court, the clerk serves notice thereof on
the owner at least twenty days in advance, accompanied by a cer-
tified copy of the plaintiff's petition.95 If defendant fails to an-
swer the petition within ten days, he forfeits all defenses he
may have had to the suit 96 except that of contending plaintiff is
not qualified to expropriate 7 and reserving always his right to
assert his estimates of valuation. The court shall proceed to hear
the case without a jury98 with the greatest possible dispatch,
even in vacation, 99 and render final judgment within forty-eight
hours after the completion of the trial.1°°
Special highway procedure. By constitutional provision, 10 1
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2635 (1870). If the owner is unknown or absent, a curator
ad hoc is to be appointed.
95. LA. R.S. 19:5 (1950).
96. Id. 19:7. Defenses such as lack of necessity for any taking and lack of
necessity for the extent asked for. Department of Highways v. Landry, 219 La.
456, 53 So.2d 232 (1951). This waiver was also found in Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. Dileo, 79 So.2d 150 (La. App. 1955), where the court said defendant also
waived the defense of "alternative location" - a defense which the owner never
has. See page 518 supra.
97. See City of Gretna v. Mitchell, 64 So.2d 873 (La. App. 1953) (dictum).
Failure of plaintiff to comply with procedural technicalities may give rise to an
exception of want of capacity which will have to be filed in limine or be consid-
ered waived.
98. The jury was abolished by La. Acts 1948, No. 325, § 2, incorporated as
LA. R.S. 19:4 (1950). A jury is not constitutionally required in expropriation
cases. Tennessee Gas Transp. Co. v. Williams, 65 So.2d 414 (La. App. 1953)
(Act 325 held to be constitutional). See Blair, Federal Condemnation Proceedings
and the Seventh Amendment, 41 H.ARv. L. REV. 29 (1927) ; Hines, Does the Sev-
enth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Require Jury Trials in
all Condemnation Proceedings?, 11 VA. L. REV. 505 (1925).
Prior to Act 325 the jury in Louisiana could be waived by stipulation of the
parties. American Tel & Tel. v. Maguire, 219 La. 740, 54 So.2d 4 (1951). While
permissible the jury functioned as a panel of experts (Postal Tel. Cable Co. v.
Louisville Ry., 43 La. Ann. 522, 9 So. 119 (1891)), but they could not ignore the
evidence before them (Shreveport v. Noel, 114 La. 187, 38 So. 137 (1950) ;
Shreveport v. Youree, 114 La. 182, 38 So. 135 (1905)) or require affirmative
action of the taker (New Orleans Pac. Ry. v. Murrell, 34 La. Ann. 536 (1882)),
or settle tort claims between the parties (Highway Comm. v. Dunn, 173 La. 998,
139 So. 324 (1932) ; Louisiana Ry. v. Sarpy, 125 La. 388, 51 So. 433 (1910)) or
determine the location of the site (New Orleans Pac. Ry. v. Robertson, 34 La. Ann.
865 (1882)), but they could determine the necessity of the extent asked for (Kan-
sas City S. Ry. v. Meyer, 166 La. 663, 117 So. 765 (1928)) and give effect to their
personal opinions (Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Louisville Ry., 43 La. Ann. 522, 9 So.
119 (1891)) even though they had no personal knowledge of the land in question
(Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Sarpy, 117 La. 156, 41 So. 477 (1906)) or any
knowledge of land values in general (Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Sarpy, 125 La.
388, 51 So. 433 (1910)). Nevertheless, their verdict in respect to valuation and
damages carried more presumptive weight of correctness than did the verdict of
an ordinary jury when reviewed on appeal. Housing Authority v. Palmer, 195
La. 608, 197 So. 247 (1940) ; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Louisiana Ry., 49 La. Ann.
1270, 22 So. 219 (1897).
99. LA. R.S. 19:8 (1950).
100. Id. 19:10.
101. La. Acts 1948, No. 548, now LA. CONST. art. VI, § 19.1: "The legislature
shall have authority to authorize the taking of property for highway purposes by
orders rendered ex parte in expropriation suits prior to judgment therein provided
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the State Highway Department is relieved of the requirement of
previous fair compensation 10 2 and may acquire the subject prop-
erty prior to final judgment of the court, determining the com-
pensation. 0 3
The petition of the Highway Department is similar to that
of any other taker, 0 4 but certain additional certificates and state-
ments are to be attached'0 5 including an estimate of the compen-
sation and damages due the owner.10 6 Upon presentation of the
petition, the court may issue an order directing that the amount
of the estimate be deposited in court and declaring that the title
to the property described in the petition shall pass to the plaintiff
upon such deposit. 0 7 The defendant will be notified that his
property has been taken when the deposit is made. Then he
may either accept it, file a motion contesting the validity of the
taking, 0 8 or apply for a trial to determine the market value of
the property. 0 9 Except in minor particulars" the case proceeds
in the manner of an ordinary expropriation suit,"' and upon
that provision be made for deposit before such taking with a court officer for the
amount of appraisals of the property so taken and damages to which the owner
thereof may be entitled, if any, which appraisals may be made in such manner
as may be provided by law either before or after institution of suit, and need not
be by judicially appointed appraisers." See DeDouchel v. Highway Comm., 172
La. 908, 135 So. 914 (1931) (prior to Act 548) and of. Highway Department v.
William T. Burton Industries Inc., 231 La. 360, 91 So.2d 375 (1956) (subsequent
to Act 548).
102. LA. CONST. arts. I, § 2, IV, § 15; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2629 (1870).
103. The general procedure applicable here is that of LA. R.S. 19:51-66 (1950),
as elaborated in LA. R.S. 48:441-460 (Supp. 1954).
104. Subject to the provisions of LA. R.S. 19:2(1) (1950). See text page 523
supra.
105. Certified copy of resolution by the Board of Highways, certificates by
highway chief engineer and other officials enumerated, statement of compensation
and damages to be paid. LA. B.S. 48:442 (1950).
106. The estimate is to be made by two or more persons selected by the state
right-of-way engineer. Id. 48:443. Apparently this provision supplants and is more
expeditious than the court-appointed appraiser method in id. 9:53.
107. Id. 48:445. If there are no buildings on the property, the department may
enter immediately; if there are buildings, the court may delay the entry up to
thirty days. Although title passes upon deposit, the defendant owes no rent to
the plaintiff for his continued possession unless he withdraws part of the deposit.
Id. 48:448.
108. If done within 10 days after notice. Id. 48:447.
109. If he answers within 13 days from notice in the case of a whole taking or
one year from notice of acceptance of the project by the department in the case
of a partial taking, he maintains any defenses he may have. Id. 48:450(1),
48:451(1). Otherwise, they are waived. Id. 48:452.
110. As in the time point for determination of value and damages (id. 48:453)
and interest computations (id. 48:455), of special interest is the last paragraph
of the last section mentioned which settles the confusing problem in expropriation
cases as to who has the burden of proof in respect to valuation and damages by
placing it on the defendant. See JAIHR, EMINENT DOMAIN § 241 (1953).
111. LA. R.S. 48:454 (1950).
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final judgment the claims of the respective parties are adjusted
relative to the deposit previously made."12
Special municipality procedure. In the case of municipalities
seeking the acquisition of an entire public utility,"1 3 upon receipt
of the plaintiff's petition the court will appoint six appraisers
who will examine the property and return a report of valua-
tion.114 If on notice to show cause why the report should not be
accepted, 115 the defendant files an opposition thereto, the case
shall proceed on the opposition in the manner of ordinary expro-
priation suits." 6 In the usual expropriation suit the business sit-
uated on the property sought is not acquired and thus the profit-
ableness of the business as an enterprise is not an element of
valuation. Here, however, the acquisition is not just of im-
movables, but includes the business itself. Thus, although no pro-
vision is made in the statutes, consideration of the utilities' prof-
itableness is proper in determining the owner's award." 7
Appeals. Article 2634 of the Civil Code provides that appeals
made by either party in expropriation cases shall not suspend the
execution of the judgment already rendered. In Orleans-Kenner
E. Ry. v. Metairie Ridge Nursery Co." 8 defendant-owner applied
to the court for a writ of mandamus ordering the lower court to
grant it a suspensive appeal in an expropriation suit" 9 in which
the taker's right to expropriate was challenged. Stating the gen-
eral rule to be that any execution may be stayed by suspensive
appeal absent some exception the court held that the sweeping
language of Article 2634, which could act as such an exception,
was inoperative in cases where the plaintiff's right to expro-
112. Id. 48:499, 456.
113. Covered by id. 19:101-107.
114. Id. 19:102.
115. Id. 19:103.
116. Id. 19:104.
117. See JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN C. XXVII (1953).
118. 136 La. 968, 68 So. 93 (1915). Justice Provosty as spokesman for the
court; Land, J., dissenting.
119. Technically the court was correct in saying that this was the first time
consideration of suspensive appeals in expropriation suits was before it, but Article
2634 was considered in another context in New Orleans Terminal Co. v. Firemen's
Charitable Ass'n, 115 La. 442, 39 So. 473 (1904). In considering the defendant-
owner's efforts to have taker's appeal quoad damages and value dismissed, the
court remarked that Article 2634 may be modified so as to permit suspensive
appeals in situations set out in Articles 2636 and 2637.
In State ex rel. Cotting v. Sommerville, 104 La. 74, 28 So. 977 (1900), defend-
ant-owner obtained mandamus from the Supreme Court ordering a suspensive
appeal from a court order setting aside an injunction on bond in a situation where
the taker entered without expropriating.
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priate is contested, and issued mandamus.120 Thus it results that
where the taker is an agency of the state, a suspensive appeal
will be refused as such a taker's right to expropriate cannot be
attacked. 121
The Revised Statutes of 1950 restated the rule of Article 2634
more precisely. In Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Wyatt
Lumber Co. 1 22 the interpretation of the Metairie Ridge Nursery
case was applied and the Revised Statutes 19:13123 was given the
same construction as that given Article 2634, thus again afford-
ing a suspensive appeal where the right of the taker to expro-
priate is challenged. 124 The amendments of 1954125 which again
restated the rule of Article 2634 with no major changes appar-
ently illustrate once more the Legislature's desire that there be
no suspensive appeal in expropriation cases. In view of the
court's pronouncements on the subject, however, it is doubtful
that the rule of the Metairie Ridge Nursery case will be held al-
tered when these provisions are applied in the future.126
120. It appears that the defense of lack of necessity allowed by Article 2636
of the Civil Code would have been insufficient to predicate a suspensive appeal
even prior to the amendments of 1954 (La. Acts 1954, No. 706, § 1, amending LA.
R.S. 19:13 (1950) and La. Acts 1954, No. 705, amending LA. CIVIL CODE art.
2634 (1870)), but there are assertions to the contrary in the dictum of Highway
Comm. v. Treadway, 173 So. 209, 211 (La. App. 1937), where the court places a
questionable construction on the language used in New Orleans Terminal Co. v.
Fireman's Charitable Ass'n, 115 La. 442, 39 So. 437 (1904): "There are only
,two defenses which, in an expropriation suit, authorize the granting of suspensive
appeals .... [It was held, in [the New Orleans Terminal Co. case] that a sus-
pensive appeal is available to the defendant in expropriation who presents either
of the defenses authorized by Articles 2636 or 2637 of the Civil Code." The New
Orleans Terminal Ry. case did not hold this, and the Treadway court failed to men-
tion the rule of the Metairie Ridge Nursery case.
121. Thus Justice Land, who dissented in the Metairie Ridge Nursery case, was
able to use it as his authority here. Highway Comm. v. Hay's Heirs, 186 La. 398,
172 So. 432 (1937). See Highway Comm. v. Bradberry, 193 So. 198 (La. App.
1940).
122. 221 La. 886, 60 So.2d 713 (1952).
123. "Appeals from the judgment of the lower court, made by either party do
not suspend the execution of the judgment." LA. R.S. 19:13 (1950).
124. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Cowley, 223 La. 672, 66 So.2d 588 (1953)
(motion to dismiss suspensive appeal denied) ; Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v.
Wyatt Lumber Co., 221 La. 886, 60 So.2d 713 (1952) (Supreme Court ordered
court of appeal to grant suspensive appeal after appeal court refused to grant
mandamus). See Rapides Central Ry. v. Missouri-Pacific Ry., 25 So.2d 828, 831
(La. App. 1946) : "There is no doubt in our minds as to the right to a suspensive
appeal on an issue involving the right and authority of a party to subject the
property of another to condemnation. It is inconceivable that any person should be
deprived of rights of ownership of property, under the application of the harsh
theory of eminent domain, and be denied the right to a suspensive appeal."
125. La. Acts 1954, No. 706, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 19:13 (1950) and La. Acts
1954, No. 705, amending LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2634 (1870).
126. There was no need to pass upon the 1954 amendments in this light in the
cases of Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Dileo, 79 So.2d 150 (La. App. 1955)
(taker had not attempted to enter subject property so suspensive appeal would
have been mere surplusage) and Department of Highways v. Central Realty In-
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Nature of the Action
The formal proceeding. The exercise of the right of eminent
domain is an action sui generis and the resulting transfer of
property is one in invictim,127 against the owner's will. Thus,
lacking the consensual element, 128 such a transfer is not a sale as
Louisiana's Civil Code, Article 2439,129 technically uses that term,
and the rules appertaining to sales proper are presumably not
applicable here. 130
The action is also a summary one 13 1 in rem,'132 hearable in va-
cation time.133 It is one in which the taker seeks to acquire the
property while at the same time the owner attempts to prevent
the acquisition, or failing in this, asserts his right to a fair com-
pensation. In such cases the taker moves with legendary sure-
ness insofar as the acquisition of the property is concerned, and
apart from the standard trivial defenses which the owner may
interject,134 the suit is primarily one involving the determination
of fair compensation to the owner. While the taker may acquire
vestment Co., 226 La. 1085, 78 So.2d 182 (1955) (no evidence offered by owner
to support his defense allegations except in respect to the propriety of the loca-
tion).
127. Purcell v. Board of Comm'rs, 153 La. 615, 96 So. 279 (1923).
128. "Three circumstances concur to the perfection of the contract, to wit: the
thing sold, the price and the consent." LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2439 (1870). See State
ex rel. Boagni v. Colorado S., N.O. & P. R.R., 120 La. 9, 44 So. 905 (1907).
129. See Purcell v. Board of Comm'rs, 153 La. 615, 96 So. 279 (1923) ; State
ex rel. Boagni v. Colorado S., N.O. & P. R.R., 120 La. 9, 13, 44 So. 905, 906
(1907) (The Civil Code "nowhere speaks of [expropriation] as a sale or con-
tract").
130. See Purcell v. Board of Comm'rs, 153 La. 615, 96 So. 279 (1923). When
defendant took owner's land, the latter compromised rather than sue. Subsequently
certain lands supposed at the time of the transfer to be public were found to be
private and under the ownership of the plaintiff who sued for their value and re-
covered. The court held that there could be no warranty that the lands were pub-
lic since the warranty provisions of the Code contemplate a voluntary sale. Since
this was a mere compromise, the reasoning of the court should apply a fortiori in
a transfer by expropriation.
131. See LA. R.S. 19:8 (1950) : "Expropriation suits . . . shall be conducted
with the greatest possible dispatch."
132. See Shreveport v. Kansas City S. & G. Ry., 181 La. 458, 463, 159 So. 715,
717 (1935) ("suits to condemn or expropriate property for public use or in the
public interest are proceedings in rem, proceedings against the property itself") ;
Iberia, St. M. & E. Ry. v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & S.S. Co., 129 La. 492, 502, 56
So. 417, 420 (1911) ("under our law . . . as in most of the other states, the pro-
ceeding to condemn or expropriate property in the public interest is essentially a
proceeding in rem, and not a suit in the ordinary sense").
133. LA. R.S. 19:8 (1950). See State ex rel. Morgan's La. & T. R. & S.S. Co.
v. St. Paul, 109 La. 8, 33 So. 49 (1.902) (suit by foreign corporation during vaca-
tion time) ; Williams v. Judge of the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, 45 La.
Ann. 1295, 14 So. 57 (1893) (writ of prohibition to suit during vacation time
refused).
134. Apparently the standard procedural exceptions are available plus the spe-
cial expropriation defenses such as those relating to public purpose, necessity,
capacity to expropriate, etc. In Port Comm. v. Morley, 232 La. 87, 93 So.2d 912
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the property, 135 the owner may be the successful party insofar
as valuation is concerned. 186
The owner's right to a fair compensation is a personal one.
Therefore, in the situation of a partial taking case,1 3 7 if the own-
er sells the residual property before he has collected his compen-
sation or before he has instituted suit for compensation, his
rights in that regard go with him and not with the property. 18 8
The subsequent vendee of the residual property will receive the
land subject to the taker's rights on the subject property, but
without any claim to compensation unless the owner has specif-
ically assigned or subrogated him thereto.1 8 9
This claim to compensation is one peculiar to the expropria-
tion proceeding and arises out of the constitutional provision on
the subject.140 This being so, even the Legislature is powerless
to deprive the owner of it or specify what amount will suffice in
an individual case.14 1 But the owner may waive his claim to com-
pensation for land taken 42 or even resulting damages 43 if his in-
(1957) several exceptions are discussed. The financial status of the taker is no
defense. Shreveport v. Texas & P. Ry., 178 La. 1087, 152 So. 913 (1934).
135. The taker is not required to acquire the property at the price set by the
court. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co. v. Lavergne, 138 La. 949, 70 So. 921 (1916).
See State ex tel. Boagni v. Colorado So., N.O. & P. R.R., 120 La. 9, 13, 44 So. 905,
906 (1907) : "Our code speaks of such expropriation as an 'expropriation,' a 'com-
pulsory transfer of property,' a 'divesting by authority of law,' or an 'adjudging of
the land to such corporation.' It nowhere speaks of it as a sale or contract."
136. See Opelousas Gulf & N.E. Ry. v. St. Landry Cotton Oil Co., 121 La.
796, 803, 46 So. 810, 812 (1908) : "It is not easy to determine who is the prevail-
ing party in an expropriation suit. One (the plaintiff) gets the property for which
he prays, and the other, the value of the land. As relates to success in the suit,
one may be considered as successful as the other."
137. Either by expropriation or by entrance by a qualified taker with the con-
sent or acquiescence of the landowner under the St. Julien rule. See page 533
infra.
138. Gumbel v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 197 La. 439, 1 So.2d 686 (1941)
(right to compensation does not pass to subsequent vendees of the owner merely by
their acquisition of title) ; Taylor v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 126 La. 420, 52
So. 562 (1910) (right to recover compensation is not connected with the title) ;
McCutchen v. Texas & P. Ry., 118 La. 436, 43 So. 42 (1907) (prescription of
ten years is applicable), but in respect to this last case, see not& 191 infra.
139. See note 138 supra.
140. LA. CONST. arts. I, § 2, IV, § 15; LA. CIviL CODE art. 2628 (1870).
141. Police Jury v. Martin, 140 La. 848, 74 So. 170 (1917) (act providing that
awards in cases of acquisition for highway purposes shall be two times the land's
assessed value held unconstitutional) and Gibbon v. Police Jury, 140 La. 854, 74
So. 172 (1916) (same).
142. See Handlin v. New Orleans, 121 La. 565, 46 So. 652 (1908) (plaintiff
dedicated his land to public use) ; Abnet v. Texarkana S. & N. Ry., 105 La. 446,
29 So. 890 (1901); Kirk v. Kansas City, S. & G. Ry., 51 La. Ann. 667, 25 So.
457 (1899).
143. He may also waive any claim he has respecting the improvements situated
on the subject property. Schneidau v. Highway Comm., 206 La. 754, 20 So.2d 14
(1944). But such waiver operates only as to severance or consequential damages
and not to damages incurred by reason of the taker's construction of a nuisance
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tention to do so is clear.144  But if the cause for the owner's
waiver fails, the owner may show this fact and proceed in suit.
14 5
The owner's right to compensation is not one arising ex
delicto,14 although there have been indications that the calcula-
tion of quantum in certain areas may be evaluated by way of tort
standards. 147 Thus where the owner's property is not "taken"
but is only "damaged" within the meaning of the constitutional
provision148 so that the owner must instigate the suit, the tort
prescriptive period is not applicable. 49 Additionally, sovereign
consent, required in suits ex delicto, is not applicable here where
the actor affects the property interests of the owner,5 0 and the
latter may present his claim by the mere fact of damage. Never-
theless, if the owner seeks to assert his claim by way of tort, he
will be compelled to make out his case by the standards relative
to suits ex delicto.'5'
In the situation where the taker seeks to acquire property,
upon payment of the adjudged award'5 2 the taker acquires the
property interest indicated by the judgment of the court and not
the interest asked for in the petition. 158 If a servitude is ac-
on the land acquired. Ibid. Neither does such waiver estop the owner from assert-
ing claims for injury due to the taker's negligent construction, nor relieve the
taker from affirmative obligations imposed on him by the judgment. Kirk v. Kansas
City, S. & G. Ry., 51 La. Ann. 667, 25 So. 457 (1899).
144. See Woodward v. Highway Comm., 151 So. 783 (La. App. 1934).
145. Green v. Highway Comm., 3 So.2d 236 (La. App. 1941).
146. Scorsune v. State, 224 La. 1031, 1033, 71 So.2d 557, 558 (1954) ("This
is not an action ex delicto and the rules applying to those actions are not ap-
plicable") ; Aleman v. Sewerage and Water Bd., 196 La. 428, 434, 199 So. 380,
382 (1940) ("a claim for compensation under the constitutional provision is wholly
inconsistent with a demand for recovery in an action in tort") ; Paret v. Highway
Comm., 178 La. 454, 458, 151 So. 768, 769 (1933) ("but this is not a tort
action") ; Nagle v. Police Jury, 175 La. 704, 144 So. 425 (1932).
147. See Department of Highways v. Laird, 219 La. 567, 53 So.2d 674 (1951).
148. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
149. Panet v. Highway Comm., 178 La. 454, 458, 151 So. 768, 769 (1933)
"The plea of prescription was properly overruled. More than one year lapsed be-
tween the date on which plaintiff's property was taken and damaged and the filing
of this suit. But this is not a tort action to which the prescription of one year
applies under Article 2315 of the Civil Code."
150. Scorsune v. State, 224 La. 1031, 71 So.2d 557 (1954) (suit for land taken
and damaged by highway department needs no legislative authorization); Nagle
v. Police Jury, 175 La. 704, 144 So. 425 (1932) ; Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069,
34 So.2d 321 (1948) (dictum). Insofar as the cases of Cope v. State Live Stock
Sanitary Bd., 176 So. 657 (La. App. 1937) and Pelt v. State Live Stock Sanitary
Bd., 178 So. 644 (La. App. 1938) rely on the case of DeMoss v. Police Jury, 167
La. 83, 118 So. 700 (1928) to sustain their position in respect to this rule, they
are overruled. Angelle v. State, supra.
151. Aleman v. Sewerage and Water Bd., 196 La. 428, 199 So. 380 (1940)
(plaintiff then failed in his burden of proof).
152. Unless previous compensation is constitutionally exempted.
153. See Maguire v. Police Jury, 197 La. 247, 1 So.2d 92 (1941) ; Knox V.
Louisiana Ry. and Nay. Co., 157 La. 602, 102 So. 685 (1925) (the judgment fore-
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quired, the taker at the same time acquires the necessary rights
of ingress and egress. 5 4 Where perfect ownership is acquired, it
passes to the taker free and clear of all mortgages and encum-
brances. 155
Once the taker elects to proceed against the owner under a
specific procedure, it will be bound by the rules contained there-
in, even though another and possibly less expensive procedure is
available.' 5 6 If the taker compromises with the owner it cannot
later refute the compromise agreement and proceed in expro-
priation. 157 However, if it occupies the property without employ-
ing any procedure, it does not thereby forfeit its right to later
elect and proceed in expropriation. 5 8 But, the mere fact that the
property is subject to expropriation does not mean that the taker
can enter thereon at his will prior to a voluntary or judicial
transfer of ownership and payment of compensation. 159 If it does
enter without the owner's consent, it will be a trespasser and an
injunction will properly lie to eject or restrain it.160 Such an in-
junction should not be dissolved on bond, and if it is, mandamus
may issue from a higher court dissolving the bonding and re-
closes all doubt on the matter of what interest was transferred). See note 48
supra for the cases dealing with the case where the interest is not specified in the
petition.
154. As necessary incidents. See State ex tel. Boagni v. Colorado S., N.O. & P.
R.R., 120 La. 9, 44 So. 905 (1907) ; Comm. Telegraph Cable Co. v. Prevost, 133
La. 47, 62 So. 347 (1913).
155. LA. R.S. 19:11 (1950). Thus in New Orleans v. Cotonio, 111 La. 545,
35 So. 740 (1903) the court ignored an allegation that mortgagee should be made
a necessary party. See also Morgan's La. & T. R.R. & S.S. Co. v. Barton, 51 La.
Ann. 1338, 26 So. 271 (1899). This cannot apply to a servient estate owing a
servitude as that servitude must also be expropriated. There is also authority to
the effect that expropriation of leased premises passes title subject to the lease.
But see LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 2641 (1870). In respect to lessees, see note 169 infra.
156. In re New Orleans, 20 La. Ann. 394 (1868). Though perhaps qualified to
proceed under the rules applicable to an acquisition of levee lands the taker pro-
ceeded via the Code articles and was held bound by their provisions. An attempt
is made to explain why this was done in Ruch v. New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 275,
9 So. 473 (1891).
157. Board of Comm'rs v. Blythe, 163 La. 929, 113 So. 150 (1927). In a case
where only assessed value had to be paid as compensation to the owner the taker
erroneously thought the assessed value of the land was very high and so com-
promised with the owner for a lesser amount and subsequently discovered the real
assessed value to be less than the amount compromised. Nevertheless he was held
to his compromise as a thing adjudged.
158. School Board v. Clark, 197 La. 131, 1 So.2d 54 (1941) ; Carrollton R.R.
v. Avart, 9 La. 205 (1836).
159. Bickham v. Shreveport, 156 La. 648, 101 So. 8 (1924) ; State ex tel. Cot-
ting v. Somerville, 104 La. 74, 28 So. 977 (1900) ; Gay v. New Orleans Pac. Ry.,
32 La. Ann. 277 (1880) ; Williams v. Department of Highways, 92 So.2d 98 (La.
App. 1957). In those situations relative to levee lands or highway construction and
all others where by constitutional provision acquisition is possible prior to judg-
ment and valuation this rule obviously does not apply.
160. See note 164 infra.
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instating the injunction.' Here, however, only the taker's right
of entrance prior to final judicial determination is affected by
such an injunction and it does not bar a subsequent expropria-
tion suit,16 2 nor need it be dissolved before the rights acquired in
such a suit can be enforced. 6 3 Actual entrance by the taker is
not necessary to support such an injunction. Any threatened
physical deprivation of the owner's interests will be sufficient, 64
provided it would amount to a "taking." However, a mere "dam-
aging" is not enough. 6 5
At the point where final decision is made in a formal expro-
priation suit that the acquisition is proper in all respects and
where the award value has been determined, it appears that the
respective rights of the parties as to the enforcement of the judg-
ment are different. The owner is subject to a liability that his
property will be taken upon the payment of the adjudged award,
but he has no right to compel payment and acquisition by the
taker. 166 If the latter abandons the proceedings while in proc-
ess 1 7 or refuses to take the property at the conclusion of the suit,
the owner has no claim for damages for any inconvenience which
he may have suffered. However, if the taker unduly delays in
concluding the proceedings, thus depriving the owner of the full
and free use of his property during the pendency of the suit, the
owner may recover damages. 68 Although the action is one in
rem, the owners of the property must be sued' 69 unless they are
161. State ex rel. Cotting v. Somerville, 104 La. 74, 28 So. 977 (1900).
162. Xavier Realty Ltd. v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 114 La. 484, 38 So. 427
(1905).
163. Ibid.
164. Bickham v. Shreveport, 156 La. 648, 101 So. 8 (1924) (injunction granted
to prevent flooding of lake which would encroach upon the plaintiff-owner's land).
165. Kuhn v. Highway Comm., 174 La. 990, 142 So. 149 (1932).
166. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co. v. Lavergne, 138 La. 949, 70 So. 921 (1916)
(judgment of expropriation only makes the payment of the adjudged award a con-
dition precedent to acquiring title; it does not condemn the plaintiff to pay the
stipulated amount).
167. Mallard v. City of Lafayette, 5 La. Ann. 112 (1850).
168. McLaughlin v. Municipality No. Two, 5 La. Ann. 504 (1850). Of. Dono-
van v. New Orleans, 11 La. Ann. 711 (1856).
169. See Shreveport v. Kansas City S. & G. Ry., 181 La. 458, 463, 159 So. 715,
717 (1935) : "Nowhere [in the articles of the Code] is found any reference to a
proceeding against any person except the owner of the land or thing .... No one
can give title to real estate except the owner, and inasmuch as the purpose of an
expropriation proceeding is to compel him to yield title, he is the sole necessary
party defendant," See also Louisiana & A. Ry. v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 127
La. 587, 53 So. 872 (1910) (for an expropriation proceeding to be valid the owners
of the land must be made parties thereto).
The lessee on the subject property is entitled to recover the increased market
value of the occupancy over the rent paid under the lease (Department of High-
ways v. Ferris, 227 La. 13, 78 So.2d 493 (1955) ; In re Morgan's R.R. & S.S. Co.,
32 La. Ann. 371 (1880)). See also Shreveport v. Kansas City S. & G. Ry., 181 La.
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unknown or out of the state. 170 Where they are unknown, the
taker should be protected in relying on the public records.17 '
Where the title to the subject property is in contest between
private parties, the taker need not await the outcome of the liti-
gation before proceeding in expropriation. He may take the
property under judicial decree and deposit the adjudged amount
into court to be paid to the rightful owner when he is deter-
mined. 72 If the taker fails to join the proper parties in a suit,
they should be allowed to intervene.' 73
St. Julien situation, unopposed use for a public purpose. If
any owner except the state1 74 expressly consents to a qualified
taker's occupation and construction, or if he silently acquiesces
therein, he cannot later eject the taker nor pose various defenses
to the acquisition; he is relegated to a claim for value and sever-
ance damages. This is the St. Julien rule, and it assumes a quali-
fied taker that could expropriate from the defendant if the nor-
mal procedure were followed.
In the leading case of St. Julien v. Morgan's Louisiana Texas
R.R.175 the taker entered the property and constructed railroad
tracks. It appeared that the owner was in daily attendance on
the construction scene and yet voiced no protest to the works
going on about him. When he later brought suit seeking posses-
sion, the court held that he was entitled only to the value of the
458, 159 So. 715 (1935) (lessee bound by all prior judgments rendered against
the lessor) ; Board of Levee Comm'rs v. Jackson's Estate, 113 La. 124, 36 So. 912
(1904) (award made to the lessee) ; Shreveport & Red River Valley Ry. v. Hinds,
50 La. Ann. 781, 24 So. 287 (1898) (lessee's rights reserved) ; In re Euphrosinne
Street, 7 La. Ann. 71 (1852) (lessee's rights calculated "as a lessee in the case
of eviction").
170. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2635, 2641 (1870).
171. Shreveport v. Kansas City S. & G. Ry., 184 La. 473, 166 So. 471 (1936)
(even if lessee was a necessary party the city could rely on the public records).
See Highway Comm. v. Israel, 205 La. 669, 17 So.2d 914 (1944) (defendant rec-
ord owner admitted she was not the real owner but by stipulation she was made
defendant and the court did not comment on this).
172. City of Westwego v. Marrero Land & Imp. Ass'n, 221 La. 564, 59 So.2d
885 (1952) (award deposited to await outcome of litigation between owner and
claimants under a recorded agreement to purchase) ; Texas & Pac. Missouri Pac.-
Terminal R.R. v. Coyle, 159 La. 1079, 106 So. 571 (1925) (award deposited to
await outcome of suit between contending parties for ownership).
In Housing Authority v. Merritt, 196 La. 955, 200 So. 311 (1941), the award
was placed in the hands of the sheriff to await the outcome of litigation. The suc-
cessful party then filed a rule to show cause and after hearing obtained the award.
173. Yazoo & M.V. R.R. v. Clarke, 120 La. 1044, 46 So. 17 (1908) (adjudi-
catee at judicial sale was allowed to intervene as being a "conditional owner").
174. Reymond v. Baton Rouge, 145 La. 162, 82 So. 75 (1919) ; Hart v. Baton
Rouge, 145 La. 173, 82 So. 79 (1919) ; State v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 52
l.a. Ann. 1411, 27 So. 795 (1899).
175. 35 La. Ann. 924 (1883).
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land taken and damages. The rationale of this well-established
rule176 is that the owner should be estopped to assert his claims
in respect to the property, and since the improvement is in the
nature of a quasi public work, to require the taker to demolish
the construction and rebuild it later when he has expropriated
the land would not only cause him needless expense but would
also result in public inconvenience. 177 The latter consideration
relative to the interest of the public appears to be especially con-
trolling, for acquiescence will apparently be presumed unless
some judicial protest is made. 17  Even where it appears that
the owner had no knowledge of his ownership, the rule has been
applied.1 7
A general rule in expropriation is that the least property in-
terest that will adequately serve the purpose of the taker will be
the only one granted to him. Thus in the St. Julien situation the
taker acquires only a special servitude8 0 of the land actually
176. Applied in many cases: Maxfield v. Gulf Utilities Co., 222 La. 987,
64 So.2d 243 (1953) ; Gumbel v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 197 La. 439, 1 So.2d
686 (1941) ; River & Rails Terminal Co. v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 171 La.
223, 130 So. 337 (1930) ; Brochett v. Shreveport, 160 La. 105, 106 La. 710 (1925) ;
Roussel v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 152 La. 517, 93 So. 758 (1922) ; Louisi-
ana Land Co. v. Blakewood, 131 La. 539, 59 So. 984 (1912) ; Webster Sand, Gravel
& Construction Co. v. Vicksburg S. & P. Ry., 129 La. 1096, 57 So. 529 (1912) ;
Tremont & Gulf Ry. v. Louisiana & A. Ry., 128 La. 299, 54 So. 826 (1911) ; Tay-
lor v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 126 La. 420, 52 So. 562 (1910) ; McCutchen v.
Texas & P. Ry., 118 La. 436, 43 So. 42 (1907) ; Goins v. Beauregard Electric Co-
operative Co., 44 So.2d 715 (La. App. 1950) ; Tate v. Town of Ville Platte, 44
So.2d 360 (La. App. 1950) ; Doll v. Sewerage and Water Bd., 43 So.2d 271 (La.
App. 1949) ; Raxsdale v. Highway Comm., 1 So.2d 342 (La. App. 1941); Sons
and Daughters of Zion v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 144 So. 765 (La. App. 1932).
The substance of the St. Julien rule was formulated in a case prior to that
decision where the owner's claim was held to be prescribed under Article 2630.
Jefferson and Lake Pontchartrain R.R. v. New Orleans, 31 La. Ann. 478 (1879).
In an even earlier case the court ordered a taker who had built a canal on the
owner's property without suit to fill it up or institute expropriation proceedings.
Bailey v. New Orleans, 19 La. Ann. 271 (1867).
The St. Julien rule is substantially incorporated in legislation in LA. R.S.
48:219 (1950).
177. The entire St. Julien rule is reviewed and cases are cited with an evalua-
tion of this rationale clearly presented in one of the finest cases on the subject in
Gumbel v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 186 La. 882, 173 So. 518 (1937). See Doll
v. Sewerage and Water Bd., 43 So.2d 271 (La. App. 1949). See also Webster
Sand, Gravel & Construction Co. v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 129 La. 1096, 57 So.
529 (1912).
178. As indicated by Mitchell v. New Orleans & N.E. R.R., 41 La. Ann. 363,
6 So. 522 (1889), where plaintiff objected to the construction of an embankment
across his land but did not go to court. But where plaintiff goes to court alleging
only that defendant tortiously entered, it may be presumed that the entrance was
without the owner's consent. Such judicial protest as is required must reasonably
follow the occupation in time, as in Tolmas v. Police Jury, 231 La. 1, 90 So.2d
65 (1956).
179. Sons and Daughters of Zion v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 144 So. 765 (La.
App. 1932).
180. John T. Moore Planting Co. v. Morgan's La. & T. R. & S.S. Co., 126
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placed in use'81 by him. This special servitude is not controlled
by the provisions of the Code relating to servitudes s2 and there-
fore it may be established without any writing'8 3 immediately
upon occupation and construction. 8 4 Neither is it subject to the
ten year non-use prescription, 8 5 but may be lost immediately if
the property is abandoned or applied to a non-public purpose. 8 6
Where the title to the subject property is in active contest be-
tween private parties, the St. Julien rule will not apply if the
taker enters with the consent of the party in possession, if the
other party is later declared the rightful owner and desires pos-
session. 87 Nor will it apply so as to prevent the owner from ap-
pealing that judgment'88 where the taker has entered under an
expropriation judgment. However, if the taker is already in pos-
session with the consent of the owner at the time of occupation,
subsequent owners and holders will take the property subject to
the taker's rights, without any claim to compensation unless spe-
cifically assigned such claim by the owner.18  This follows even
though the public records do not reflect the taker's occupation. 90
La. 840, 872, 53 So. 22, 33 (1910) ("the owner of the land cannot be presumed
to have acquiesced in the railroad's taking more than it had need of, or than the
law authorized it to take by expropriation") ; Louisiana Land Co. v. Blakewood,
131 La. 539, 59 So. 984 (1912) ; McCutchen v. Texas & P. Ry., 118 La. 436, 43
So. 42 (1907).
181. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Dileo, 79 So.2d 150 (La. App. 1955).
182. Gumbel v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 186 La. 882, 890, 173 So. 518, 520
(1937) ("and the application of the doctrine is not dependent upon the lapse of
any specific prescriptive period and even a brief period of occupancy and use of
the property by a public utility, with the knowledge, consent, or acquiescence of
the landowner, will suffice to effectuate the [St. Julien] doctrine in favor of the
utility") ; John T. Moore Planting Co. v. Morgan's La. & T. R. & S.S. Co., 126
La. 840, 872, 53 So. 22, 33 (1910) ("these decisions [applying the St. Julien rule)
are not founded upon any law of prescription").
183. That the agreement evidencing the servitude must be in writing "is or-
dinarily true, but where the one who claims the servitude has the power of eminent
domain, and has actually used the property with the acquiescence of the owner,
then the rule ...does not apply." Tate v. Ville Platte, 44 So.2d 360, 363 (La.
App. 1950).
184. See note 182 supra.
185. See note 60 supra.
186. Ibid.
187. Roussel v. Railways Realty Co., 137 La. 616, 69 So. 27 (1915) (apply-
ing Article 2453 of the Code).
188. Yazoo & M.V. R.R. v. Longview Sugar Co., 135 La. 542, 65 So. 638
(1914).
189. See note 138 8upra.
190. The language used in Webster, Sand, Gravel & Construction Co. v. Vicks-
burg, S. & P. Ry., 129 La. 1096, 1100, 57 So. 529, 531 (1912) is especially perti-
nent and clear: "[T]his court has repeatedly held that purchasers of immovable
property, save in cases of fraud, and certain others, exceptional in character, are
affected only by adverse titles and incumbrances which are spread upon the public
records . . . .The case of a [corporation affected with a public interest] which,
with the consent or acquiescence of the owner, has [entered and constructed] upon
his land, is of the exceptional character to which we have just above referred, and
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It is thus seen that by failure to protest the entrance and con-
struction by a qualified taker, the owner may lose the right to
reclaim his property. By his continued failure to institute suit
against the taker, he may also forfeit his right to compensation.
Although there is authority to the contrary,191 it appears that
the prescription of ten years should in this situation be applicable
to the owner's claim.192
Independent damaging. It is not necessary that an owner
have property interests "taken" from him by formal suit or by
his acquiescence for a cause of action to arise in eminent domain.
It is enough that his property is "damaged" within the meaning
of the constitutional provision.193  In this area, the injury must
causally94 occur either intentionally or as a necessary conse-
quence of the actor's activity.195 The De Moss case and following
it is now well settled that, in such a case, though the consent or acquiescence be
not spread upon the public records, neither the owner of the land nor those who
claim under him can recover such land, free of the servitude so acquired by the
[corporation], the remedy being an action for the value of the land used and for
damages." (Emphasis added.)
191. This is by application of the last provision of Article 2630 of the Code,
which reads: "All claims for land, or damages to the owner caused by its expro-
priation for the construction of any public works, shall be barred by two years'
prescription, which shall commence to run from the date at which the land was
actually occupied and used for the construction of the works."
It appears that this proviso was added by Act 38 of 1855 to cover the situa-
tion of occupation by judgment decree before payment of compensation which is
no longer possible. Mitchell v. New Orleans & N.E. R.R., 41 La. Ann. 363, 6 So.
522 (1889). Thus there had to be an expropriation suit. Amet v. Texas & P. Ry.,
117 La. 454, 41 So. 721 (1906) ; Scovell v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 117 La.
459, 41 So. 723 (1906).
La. Act 96 of 1896 amended LA. REV. STAT. § 1479 (1870), which was the
counterpart of LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2630 (1870), by adding the words "taking or"
before expropriation. This was said, however, not to make the article applicable
to an appropriation. Amet v. Texas & P. By., supra. Act 96 of 1896 and LA. REv.
STAT. § 1479 (1870) were incorporated in LA. R.S. 19:2 (1950), but the provision
for two-year prescription was not included, although it still stands in Article 2630
of the Civil Code. This later embodiment of the provision was applied to defeat
the claims of the owners in Donaldson's Heirs v. New Orleans, 166 La. 1059, 118
So. 134 (1928) ; Tremont & Gulf Ry. v. Louisiana & A. Ry., 128 La. 299, 54 So.
826 (1911) ; Jefferson and Lake Pontchartrain R.R. v. New Orleans, 31 La. Ann.
478 (1879).
In Bourree v. Roy, 232 La. 149, 94 So.2d 13 (1957), the court found it unneces-
sary to pass on the application of the prescriptive provision of Article 2630 in a
situation involving appropriation for levee purposes.
192. McCutchen v. Texas & P. Ry., 118 La. 436, 43 So. 42 (1907) (owner's
claim is a personal one and barred by prescription of ten years under Article 3544).
See Poindexter v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 14 La. App. 339 (1929).
193. This provision is discussed at note 12 supra. Jarnagin v. Highway Comm.,
5 So.2d 660, 664 (La. App. 1942) : "We are of the opinion that a physical invasion
of real property or of a real right is not indispensable to the infliction of damages
within the meaning of the constitutional guaranty under discussion."
194. See Beck v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 72 So.2d 765 (La. App. 1954) (city
used pile driver and cement mixer which plaintiff unsuccessfully contended caused
vibrations which damaged his property).
195. The rule is established by Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So.2d 321
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cases, holding that injuries negligently and proximately resulting
from an exercise of the power of eminent domain are compen-
sable, have been overruled. 9 6 This clarifies the meaning of the
word "damage" in the Constitution and is consistent with the
rule that tortious injuries which occur prior 97 to the occupation
or those which may arise subsequent thereto198 cannot be consid-
ered in a suit under eminent domain rules. There the remedy is
a separate tort suit and the expropriation suit 99 is not res ju-
(1948). A typical situation is where street grades are changed or bridges built
which injure the adjoining property. There it seems the power being exercised is
one of police; nevertheless, property interests of value are taken from the owner.
Streets: Manning v. Shreveport, 119 La. 1044, 44 So. 882 (1907) ; Britt v. Shreve-
port, 83 So.2d 476 (La. App. 1955). See applications in Warner v. New Orleans,
230 La. 1024, 89 So.2d 885 (1956) (no recovery) ; Smith v. New Orleans, 230 La.
282, 88 So.2d 221 (1956) (recovery) ; Cucurullo v. New Orleans, 229 La. 463, 86
So.2d 103 (1956) (recovery). Benefits may be offset. LA. R.S. 33:3742 (1950) ;
Manning v. Shreveport, supra; Britt v. Shreveport, supra. Claims are prescribed in
two years. LA. R.S. 9:5603 (1950). See Foster v. New Orleans, 155 La. 889, 99
So. 686 (1924) (prescriptive provision not applicable for damages resulting from
construction of swimming pool by city).
Bridges: Patin v. New Orleans, 223 La. 703, 66 So. 616 (1953) ; Harrison v.
Highway Comm., 202 La. 345, 11 So.2d 612 (1942). But if the damage is general
to the community at large there will be no recovery. Compare Jarnagin v. High-
way Comm., 5 So.2d 660 (La. App. 1942) (recovery denied) with Sholars v.
Highway Comm., 6 So.2d 153 (La. App. 1942) (same situation but property was
closer to overpass and more particularly affected thereby, so recovery was allowed).
Mere injurious diversion of traffic is not here recoverable. Patin v. New Orleans,
supra.
196. DeMoss v. Police Jury, 167 La. 83, 118 So. 700 (1928), overruled in
part by Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So.2d 321 (1948).
197. Highway Comm. v. Dunn, 173 La. 998, 139 So. 324 (1932) (lower court's
instruction that the jury should not consider any elements of damage occurring
prior to the filing of suit since defendant already had a cause of action for them
was approved). Of. Highway Comm. v. DeBouchel, 174 La. 968, 142 So. 142
(1932).
198. See Yazoo & M.V. R.R. v. Longview Sugar Co., 135 La. 542, 65 So. 638
(1914) (possible damage from obnoxious seeds) ; Commercial Telegraph Cable Co.
v. Prevost, 133 La. 47, 62 So. 347 (1913) (possible future fire losses which may
,be caused by the taker's operation) ; Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Sarpy, 125 La.
388, 51 So. 433 (1910) (subsequent trespass). See also New Orleans Pac. Ry. v.
Gay, 31 La. Ann. 430, 432 (1879) ("The fact that the corporation after expro-
priation may so use or misuse the property taken as to injure the person from
whom it has been wrested, is a very fit subject for legislative consideration, and
some remedy ought to be provided. But it is the duty of this court to administer
the law as it is, and not as it ought to be.").
But see Kansas City S. & G. By. v. Roberts, 49 La. Ann. 859, 861, 21 So. 630,
631 (1897) ("Something should have been allowed; much less, however, than is
claimed") ; Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific R.R. v. Dillard, 35 La. Ann. 1045
(1883) (the capitalization process approved by the court apparently included con-
sideration of the possibility of future tortious damage).
While the possibility of future tortious damages is not generally evaluated per
se, it may be reflected in a recovery by its impact on the market value of the re-
maining property. The distinction is made apparent in Yazoo & M.V. R.R. v.
Teissier, 134 La. 958, 64 So. 866 (1914) (damages from obnoxious seeds presents
an action when it occurs, but if the property were depreciated immediately, recov-
ery would be allowed).
199. Although the authority for this rule rests on a case involving a formal
expropriation suit it should be applicable as well in a St. Julien type suit or a
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dicata as to those damages.20 Whether an injury is considered
as tortious or a "damaging of property" 201 is important in three
particulars. 202 If a damaging is found: (1) the state may be sued
without its consent if it is the actor;203 (2) the extent of the re-
covery is the diminution in market value and is not measured by
ex delicto standards;204 and (3) negligence is not an item of
proof.205
Since the determination of the damages is predicated on the
difference in the market value of the property before and after
the actor's action, it is obvious that the constitutional provision
of previous compensation is inapplicable here.20 6 Neither can the
owner enjoin the actor from so injuring his property so long as
the actor moves lawfully.20 7
Determination of the Award:208 Compensation for Land Taken:
Damages: Interests and Costs
In expropriation the most productive area of litigation has
been the determination of the "fair compensation" which must
suit for damages under the constitutional provision. See Dunn v. Highway Comm.,
175 La. 484, 143 So. 381 (1932).
200. Dunn v. Highway Comm., 175 La. 484, 143 So. 381 (1932).
201. It should 'be noted that under the intentional rule of the Angelle case the
case is technically a tortious one, thus the rules are not respectively exclusive, but
recovery may be possible under the'damage rule while not possible under the tort
rule.
202. Also since treatment in respect to relief is legally different. See Hebert
v. T. L. James & Co., 72 So.2d 754, 756 (La. App. 1954) : "We mention these vari-
ous types of claims ['tort action pure and simple .. .possessory action coupled
with a claim for damages . . .damages under Section 2 of Article 1 of the Consti-
tution'] because the relief and quantum of damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs
and the other matters and things to be considered in assessing them vary accord-
ing to the law upon which the claim and relief are predicated."
203. This rule is applicable for all claims arising in relation to eminent domain.
See Scorsune v. State, 224 La. 1031, 71 So.2d 557 (1954) (legislative authoriza-
tion not necessary); Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So.2d 321 (1948) ; Nagle
v. Police Jury, 175 La. 704, 144 So. 425 (1932).
204. Aleman v. Sewerage and Water Bd., 196 La. 428, 199 So. 380 (1940)
Harrison v. Highway Comm., 191 La. 839, 186 So. 354 (1939); Manning v.
Shreveport, 119 La. 1044, 44 So. 882 (1907). See an application in Smith v. New
Orleans, 230 La. 282, 88 So.2d 221 (1956) , Britt v. Shreveport, 83 So.2d 476
(La. App. 1955) ; Jarnagin v. Highway Comm., 5 So.2d 660 (La. App. 1942).
The difference in recovery in the respective situations is explained in Hebert v.
T. L. James & Co., 72 So.2d 754 (La. App. 1954) and Jarnagin v. Highway
Comm., supra. In one the recovery is the diminution in market value, whereas in
the other it is the cost of restoration and the value of the lost use. The relief
possible is also different. See note 202 supra.
205. Aleman v. Sewerage and Water Bd., 196 La. 428, 199 So. 380 (1940).
206. Kuhn v. Highway Comm., 174 La. 990, 142 So. 149 (1932).
207. Ibid.
208. The normal expropriation case is simply a judicial procedure leading to
the determination by the court of the award. Thus square holdings on specific
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be paid to the owner. Neither the taker nor the owner can truly
be said to carry the burden of proof here.20 9 Fair compensation
is simply a "condition precedent" to the acquisition of the
taker. 210
It is well settled that "fair compensation" means market
value,211 but a short analysis of this hornbook rule will facilitate
an evaluation of the holdings. Substantively the rule should be
stated that market value is the normal process by which fair
compensation is determined, for actually the very term is at odds
with the purported objective it seeks to fulfill. 212 In the case of
real estate there is no normal market in the sense of a hypo-
thetically perfect market.218 The continued use of the term mar-
ket value by the courts implies a value that does not consider the
items cannot be expected and one may only look to the context and the language
used to determine the factors and their weight in the final determination. There
are many various items employed by the courts to determine the proper compensa-
tion. Only those items which have been elaborated in Louisiana will be considered
in the following sections.
209. Jurisdictions differ on this point. See JAIIR, EMINENT DOMAIN § 241
(1953). Cf. LA. R.S. 48:453 (1950) (in the special highway procedure the defend-
ant-owner has the :burden of proof in respect to both the market value of the land
taken and the damages incurred). Query: What result when he fails to sustain
this burden?
In respect to other items in the suit, burdens are placed on the respective
parties. See 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.213 (3d ed. 1950).
210. LA. CONST. arts. I, § 2, IV, § 15; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2629 (1870). Cf.
LA. CONST. arts. VI, § 19.1 (highways) and XVI, § 7, as amended (Orleans Levee
district). See Levee Comm'rs v. Aurianne, 229 La. 83, 85 So.2d 39 (1955).
Prior to the Constitution of 1879 it was simply provided that "private property
shall not be taken for public purposes without adequate compensation." McMahon
v. St. Louis, Ark. & Texas R.R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 6 So. 640 (1889).
211. A few select cases are: Louisiana v. Ragusa, 99 So.2d 20 (La. 1958)
Louisiana v. Sauls, 99 So.2d 97 (1958) ; School Bd. v. Nassif, 232 La. 218, 94
So.2d 40 (1957) ; Recreation and Park Comm. v. Perkins, 231 La. 869, 93 So.2d
198 (1957) ; Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Simmons, 229 La. 165, 85 So.2d 251
(1956) ; American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. East End Realty Co., 223 La. 532, 66 So.2d
327 (1953) ; Shreveport v. Abe Meyer Corp., 219 La. 128, 52 So.2d 445 (1951) ;
New Orleans v. Noto, 217 La. 657, 47 So.2d 36 (1950) ; State v. Barbe, 209 La.
185, 24 So.2d 372 (1946) ; State v. Dowling, 205 La. 1061, 18 So.2d 616 (1944) ;
Highway Comm. v. Paciera, 205 La. 784, 18 So.2d 193 (1944) ; Housing Authority
v. Persson, 203 La. 255, 13 So. 853 (1943) ; McMahon v. St. Louis, Ark. & Texas
R.R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 6 So. 640 (1889) ; Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Dileo,
79 So.2d 150 (La. App. 1955) ; Carter v. Highway Comm., 6 So.2d 159 (La. App.
1942). See also 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.2 (3d ed. 1950) ; JAHR,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 66 (1953).
See the discussion at note 216 infra relative to Article 2633 of the Code.
212. And will be abandoned when there is no available evidence thereof.
213. Nor is there in respect to any product. However, the perfect market con-
cept provides a norm from which to measure deviations and in this respect real
estate generally deviates more than any other product.
In essence, the perfect market envisions a situation of free and unrestricted
play of the counterbalancing forces of supply and demand in relation to a homo-
geneous product in a market situation where marginal producers have full free-
dom to enter or leave. Real estate is not homogeneous and, except in so far as rec-
lamation and clearance projects are concerned, has a fixed supply.
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individual and particular needs of either party. 214 It is an ob-
jective value that is reached "in a voluntary sale between a seller
willing to sell and a buyer willing to buy considering all possible
uses of the land. '215
Keeping these considerations in mind, two broad and general
rules relative to the evidence of valuation offered and accepted
in the expropriation suit come to light. Any evidence that rele-
vantly bears on value should be admissible so long as it is not
obviously biased.216 The nearer that the situation which produces
the admissible evidence approaches the situation of the hypothet-
ically perfect market, the greater should be its probative weight.
Prior sales. Although there has been some diversity of opin-
ion in other jurisdictions as to the admissibility of prior sales as
evidence of market value, 217 Louisiana has been consistent in its
acceptance of them.21s Prior sales have here been held to be the
214. Neither value to the taker (Yazoo & M.V. R.R. v. Teissier, 134 La. 958,
64 So. 866 (1914), but of. Orleans & J. Ry. v. Jefferson & L.P. Ry., 51 La. Ann.
1605, 26 So.278 (1899) nor special value to the owner (Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co.
v; Jones, 113 La. 29, 36 So. 877 (1904)) is the measure; it is what the owner
has objectively lost that controls (Housing Authority v. Green, 200 La. 463, 8
So.2d 295 (1942) ; 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 12.21, 12.22 (3d ed. 1950);
JAHa, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 68, 69 (1953)).
The various situations presenting exceptions to this general rule have not been
elaborated in Louisiana as well as in some other jurisdictions.
215. Louisiana v. Ragusa, 99 So.2d 20 (La. 1958) ; Shreveport v. Abe Meyer
Corp., 219 La. 128, 52 So.2d 445 (1951) ; Highway Comm. v. Paciera, 205 La.
784, 18 So.2d 193 (1944) ; Louisville & N. R.R. v. R. E. E. DeMontluzin Co., 116
La. 211, 116 So. 854 (1928) ; John T. Moore Planting Co. v. Morgan's La. & T.
R. & S.S. Co., 126 La. 840, 53 So. 22 (1910); Opelousas G. & N.E. R.R. v.
Bradford, 118 La. 506, 43 So. 79 (1907).
216. Shreveport v. Abe Meyer Corp., 219 La. 128, 134, 52 So.2d 445, 441
(1951) : "Article 2633 of the Civil Code, in speaking of true value, contemplates of
course, that the criterion to be used in expropriation proceedings in arriving at
the basis for assessment is market value, that is, the price which would be agreed
upon at a voluntary sale between a willing seller and purchaser, taking into con-
sideration all the available uses of the land .... But this does not mean that the
evidence elicited in an expropriation case is to be restricted to testimony showing
market value for all purposes. On the contrary, the inquiry extends to any and
all evidence which might be of aid to the court in determining the true value pro-
vided for in Article 2633." (Emphasis added.) See also Louisiana v. Ragusa, 99
So.2d 20 (La. 1958) (application of Article 2633).
217. The argument of those opposed to the use of prior sales is chiefly predi-
cated on the purported likelihood of involving the suit in a flood of collateral
issues relative to each such sale introduced, in an effort to adduce the bona fide
free market character, vel non, of such sale. In view of Louisiana's tendency to
accept almost any type sale regardless of its origin so long as the bona fide nature
of the transaction has been established, this argument has little force here. See 4
NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.311(3), n. 52 (3d ed. 1950) ; I ORGEL, VALUA-
TION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 137 (2d ed. 1953); JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN
§140 (1953).
218. Mississippi River Bridge Authority v. Curry, 232 La. 140, 94 So.2d 9
(1957) ; Police Jury v. Hernandez, 232 La. 1, 93 So.2d 672 (1957) ; Recreation
and Park Comm. v. Perkins, 231 Ta. 869, 93 So.2d 198 (1957) ; Housing Author-
ity v. 'olner, 231 La. 452, 91 So.2d 600 (1956) ; Louisiana Power & Light Co.
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"best guide 219 or the "best criteria ' 2 0 of market value. Sales
evidence may come in as direct evidence or indirectly through
testimony.' 1 These sales, which may be of the subject property
itself or other property, are not conclusive as to value, but are
merely indicative thereof.222 They will however be more proba-
tive of market value as they become more similar to the subject
property pictured in a normal market in three general respects,
location and topography,2 3 similarity of the market situation
existent at the time of their consummation as compared with the
market at the time of valuation,2 4 and the respective bargaining
positions of the parties involved.2 5
It is noticeable that very little reliance has been placed on
prior sales of the subject property itself. This may be due to a
lack of evidence relating to such sales, or a lack of such sales
themselves. Possibly such evidence, of necessity antedating the
time at which valuation is to be made, may have its origin in such
a different market that it is unreliable. However, even in those
cases where prior sales of the subject property were offered in
the form of cost to the owner, little note was taken of them.16
v. Simmons, 229 La. 165, 85 So.2d 251 (1956) ; New Orleans v. Noto, 217 La. 657,
47 So.2d 36 (1950) ; Shreveport v. Herndon, 173 La. 144, 136 So. 297 (1931) ;
Texas Pac.-Missouri Pac Terminal R.R. v. Walter, 166 La. 340, 117 So. 272
(1928) ; New Orleans v. Salvatore, 167 La. 891, 120 So. 587 (1929) ; Texas Pac.-
Missouri Pac. Terminal R.R. v. Dittmar, 161 La. 444, 108 So. 877 (1926) ; Louisi-
ana Ry. & Navigation Co. v. Morere, 116 La. 997, 41 So. 236 (1906) ; New Orleans
v. Manfre, 111 La. 927, 35 So. 981 (1904) ; New Orleans v. Morgan, 111 La. 851,
35 So. 951 (1904) ; New Orleans v. Schroeder, 111 La. 653, 35 So. 800 (1904).
219. Louisiana v. Sauls, 99 So.2d 97 (La. 1958).
220. Mississippi River Bridge Authority v. Curry, 232 La. 140, 94 So.2d 9
(1957).
221. Since title is not here involved the parole evidence rule re immovable prop-
erty is not applicable. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Morere, 116 La. 997, 41 So.
236 (1906).
222. "While the sales of other property in the locality can be given considera-
tion in determining the market value of the property sought to be expropriated,
they are not controlling but are of some probative value where some similarity
exists so that the probable values are the same." Gulf States Utilities Co. v.
Domingue, 72 So.2d 623, 624 (La. App. 1954).
223. "[O]n the issue of value of the property sought to be expropriated, evi-
dence of the value of other property is helpful only where there is such similarity
[in the properties] as renders it probable that the values are similar." State V.
Dowling, 205 La. 1061, 1067, 18 So.2d 616, 618 (1944).
See New Orleans v. Noto, 217 La. 657, 47 So.2d 36 (1950) ; Louisville & N.
R.R. v. R. E. E. DeMontluzin Co., 166 La. 211, 116 So. 854 (1928) ; New Orleans,
v. Manfre, 111 La. 927, 35 So. 981 (1904) ; New Orleans v. Morgan, 111 La. 851,
35 So. 951 (1904) ; New Orleans v. Schroeder, 111 La. 653, 35 So. 800 (1904).
224. See Housing Authority v. Boudwine, 224 La. 988, 71 So.2d 541 (1954)
(court noticed general increase in property prices).
225. There are those "who sell 'a shin for a groat and buy the tail for a
shilling'." Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Kohn, 116 La. 159, 40 So. 602 (1906).
226. See Highway Comm. v. Grey, 197 La. 942, 2 So.2d 654 (1941) (cost car-
ried little weight and was above the amount recovered) ; New Orleans v. otonio
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But it should be noted that in such cases, assuming the bargain-
ing was bona fide and the market conditions remained un-
changed, the prior sale should carry almost conclusive weight.
Under such circumstances the court does not have to contend
with what is perhaps the most difficult of the three above-men-
tioned considerations -similarity in respect to topography.
Thus in Shreveport v. Herndon,27 a prior auction sale of the sub-
ject property was said to carry the presumption that it represent-
ed the then market value of the property. Since the testimony of
witnesses who had testified that there had been no change in
market values was undisputed, the court increased the almost
sacrosanct jury award to a figure more in line with the prior
auction price.
Although, where similarity in topography and location of the
resulting price is not found, adjustment may be made, 228 this is
far simpler in cases involving unimproved land where it may be
made on a per acre basis than in situations involving improved
property. In the latter situation, however, reasonable and work-
able adjustments may be made by accepted appraisal tech-
niques2 29 and it is to be presumed that such adjustment is more
usually presented in the form of testimony of a reputable real
estate expert rather than being performed by the court itself.
There has not been sufficient judicial elaboration of the sec-
ond consideration relating to the market situation as to permit
any formulation of a general rule peculiar to Louisiana. 28 0
In respect to the third consideration - bargaining positions
of the parties - Louisiana is somewhat out of line with other
jurisdictions in that prices produced by deviations from a nor-
mal, free market are considered as evidence of value. In Louisi-
111 La. 545, 35 So. 740 (1903) (court noticed that defense counsel did not allege
defendant should be paid what the property cost).
227. 173 La. 144, 136 So. 297 (1931).
228. Or the sales may be thrown out and resort made to what the court terms
"intrinsic evidence," which is in effect considerations directed more at the sub-
jective value of the property. See Housing Authority v. Boudwine, 224 La. 988,
71 So.2d 541 (1954) ; Housing Authority v. Brinkman, 224 La. 262, 69 So.2d 37
(1953) ; Kansas City S. & G. Ry. v. Smith's Heirs, 51 La. App. 1079, 25 So. 955
(1899).
229. See note 267 infra and accompanying text.
230. Cf. Housing Authority v. Boudwine, 224 La. 988, 71 So.2d 541 (1954)
(court noticed increase in property prices) and New Orleans v. Salvatore, 167 La.
891, 120 So. 587 (1929) (attempt to show depreciation in the area was defeated).
See JAHn, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 75, 76 (1953); 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 12.311 (z) et 8eq. (3d ed. 1950) ; 1 OROEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN
.§§ 24, 25 (2d ed. 1953).
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arna Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Morrere231 the court remarked that prior
sales should not be admissible unless accompanied by proof that
the prices recited in them were bona fide. This probably meant
there must be evidence that such sales were actually consum-
mated at the prices declared and it did not mean that the prices
should have been reached as a result of free bargaining. The
jurisprudence presents instances where monopoly sales, 23 2 sales
in compromise, 23 3 and expropriation awards2 4 have been consid-
ered by the courts.23 5 The usage of such transactions as evidence
of value is at odds with numerous authorities.2 3 0 In such cases
the factors present tend to reduce the price paid and therefore, if
considered, will work to reduce the owner's compensation.
Sales of specialty property, however, have been excluded from
consideration by the court.237 Apparently, then, the court is more
inclined to exclude prior sales where the deviation from the nor-
mal market situation is one relative to the nature of the property
involved rather than the respective bargaining status of the par-
ties concerned.
Offers. In the Morrere case 23 8 Justice Provosty said offers
"are a class of evidence safer to reject than to receive. ' ' 239 Such
a flat enunciation, though supported by eminent authority,2 40
may be questioned. 241 The possibility of being engulfed in collat-
231. 116 La. 997, 41 So. 236 (1906).
232. Louisiana v. Sauls, 99 So.2d 97 (La. 1958); Mississippi River Bridge
Authority v. Simon, 232 La. 668, 95 So.2d 144 (1957).
233. Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm. v. Watson, 224 La. 136, 68 So.2d 901
(1953). Compromise made with part owner who had 1/3 interest in subject prop-
erty. In expropriation against the two other co-owners, each holding a 1/3 interest,
the court reasoned that the sale to the first owner was one at "market price" and
made the expropriation award to each defendant owner exactly that. See New Or-
leans v. Noto, 217 La. 657, 47 So.2d 36 (1950) ; Texas Pac.-Missouri Pac. Terminal
R.R. v. Elliott, 166 La. 347, 117 So. 275 (1928); Texas Pac.-Missouri Pac.
Terminal R.R. v. Dittmar, 161 La. 444, 108 So. 877 (1926) ; Louisiana Ry. &
Nay. Co. v. Morere, 116 La. 997, 41 So. 236 (1906).
234. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Morere, 116 La. 997, 41 So. 236 (1906).
235. But see Levee Comm'rs v. Orangedale Colony Co., 164 La. 77, 113 So.
772 (1927) (price paid to levee district for lands donated to them by the state
excluded since it was known that an "insignificant price" was involved in such a
situation).
236. Which are collected in J"AHR, EMINENT DOMAIN § 139 (1953) ; 4 NicHOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.3113 et seq. (3d ed. 1950) ; 1 OROEL, VALUATION UNDER
EMINENT DOMAIN § 140 (2d ed. 1953).
237. Highway Comm. v. Guidry, 176 La. 389, 146 So. 1 (1933).
238. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Morere, 116 La. 997, 41 So. 236 (1906).
239. Id. at 1004, 41 So. at 238.
240. 4 NIcHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.3113(3) (3d ed. 1950).
241. Offers have been considered both before and after the Morere case. New
Orleans v. Schroeder, 111 La. 653, 35 So. 800 (1904). Here, apparently the offer
was made by a third person to sell property other than the subject property -
one of the weakest situations in which an offer should be relied on. In New Or-
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eral issues is especially prominent in respect to the employment
of offers of other property as evidence of value. 242 Thus in any
event, consideration of offers should be limited only to offers
pertaining to the subject property itself. Generally in the normal
bargaining transactions which precede a conventional sale both
parties present their respective positions tempered with a certain
amount of bargaining leeway. The proposed buyer offers less
than that which he would be willing to pay and the proposed
seller asks more than the least amount he would be willing to
accept. Therefore, assuming stable economic conditions in the
interim between such an offer and the valuation in expropria-
tion, if the purported buyer's offer can be held against him as
an admission243 that the property is worth at least that much, the
purported seller's offer should be held against him as an admis-
sion that the property is worth no more.244 Thus while a party
should not be able to use his own offer in his favor, he should at
times be able to use the other party's offer against that other
party. In some cases, therefore, it would seem that it is better
to receive than to reject.
Assessments. It is common knowledge that assessments made
by the state for tax purposes are not synonymous with true
value. 245 The Louisiana courts have judicially noticed2 46 this and
at times have excluded such values in determining an award.247
But at other times, assessment values were considered in the val-
leans v. Reatz, 162 La. 861, 111 So. 260 (1927), the offer was by the plaintiff to
purchase other property. See also Housing Authority v. Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So.
295 (1942).
In Morgan's Louisiana & T. R. & S.S. Co. v. John T. Moore Planting Co., 130
La. 78, 57 So. 635 (1912), an offer was excluded on the grounds that it was a
compromise offer and compromises should be protected. Texas Pipe Line Co. v.
Barbe, 229 La. 191, 85 So.2d 260 (1956) excluded an offer, but the offer was
made by a third person to a landowner other than the defendant.
242. 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.3113(3) (3d ed. 1950).
243. As it was in Housing Authority v. Gondolfo, 208 La. 1065, 24 So.2d 78
(1945). However, if the defendant-owner refuses to sell at the offers of third per-
sons, those offers should not be considered. Contra, Housing Authority v. Green,
200 La. 469, 8 So.2d 295 (1942).
244. Jahr would follow such a course. JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN 223 (1953).
See 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 148 (2d ed. 1953) for an
evaluation of the cases relative to this problem in other jurisdictions.
245. In Baton Rouge v. Cross, 147 La. 719, 85 So. 883 (1920), it was brought
out that certain lots were assessed in 1919 for $400 and $500. Yet the assessor
testified in 1920 that the lots were then worth $2,200 and $2,800. "It is a matter
of common knowledge that real property is not assessed in this state at its market
value." Highway v. Guidry, 176 La. 389, 404, 146 So. 1 (1933). See also State
v. Barbe, 209 La. 185, 24 So.2d 372 (1945).
246. Shreveport v. Noel, 114 La. 187, 190, 38 So. 137, 138 (1905).
247. Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Morere, 116 La. 997, 41 So. 236 (1906) (pro-
duction of assessment value will be a useless encumbering of the record, unless
accompanied by proof that the appraisement was made by the owner himself).
COMMENTS
uation process and apparently used as the bases of the awards in
some cases. In this employment, 248 Louisiana is at variance with
other jurisdictions where no consideration is given to official
valuations of property.2 49 For his purposes, the assessor's valua-
tion is adequate if it is relatively correct. But even though suit-
able for official purposes, assessments are matters of official
guesswork and have no proper place in an expropriation suit. A
typical rationale that is offered in support of Louisiana's posi-
tion in this matter was set forth in the case of Board of Levee
Comm'rs v. Hackson's Estate.2 50 There it was said that since the
owner pays taxes to the state based on such a figure, he should
not complain when the state seeks to acquire the property for
that price. Conceding 251 the force of such an argument when the
taker is the state, it is weakened where the acquisition is by a
non-sovereign taker. Fortunately, however, assessed value does
not control award determination,252 but is only a factor to be con-
sidered.255
Expert testimony. One of the major devices employed by the
courts to elicit market value data is expert testimony.25 4 Since
an early period, Louisiana has relied on such testimony 25 5 and it
248. State v. Barbe; 209 La. 185, 24 So.2d 372 (1945) ; New Orleans v. Lar-
roux, 103 La. 990, 14 So.2d 812 (1943) (reversing lower court for excluding
assessment value) ; Booth v. Highway Comm., 171 La. 1096, 133 So. 169 (1931) ;
Louisiana & A. Ry. v. Moseley, 117 La. 313, 41 So. 585 (1906). Apparently, as-
sessed value was used as the basis of the award in New Orleans Land Co. v. Board
of Levee Comm'rs, 171 La. 718, 132 So. 121 (1930).
249. See the cases and authorities collected. 5 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 22.1 (3d ed. 1950). See also JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN § 152 (1953) and 1 ORGEL,
VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN C. XIII (2d ed. 1953).
250. 113 La. 124, 36 So. 912 (1904).
251. Actually the argument has little merit. The state apportions the tax bur-
den among the various land holdings. If the assessed value were greater, nearer
to real value, the tax rate would be reduced and vice versa.
252. Whether it is attempted to be so used by the courts (Oury v. Board of
Aldermen, 151 La. 421, 91 So. 825 (1922)) or by the legislature (Police Jury V.
Martin, 140 La. 848, 74 So. 170 (1917) ; Gibbon v. Police Jury, 140 La. 854, 74
So. 172 (1916)).
253. State v. Barbe, 209 La. 185, 24 So. 372 (1945) ; New Orleans v. Larroux,
103 La. 990, 14 So.2d 812 (1943) ; Louisiana & A. Ry. v. Moseley, 117 La. 313,
41 So. 585 (1906).
254. See JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN C. XX (1953) ; 5 NICHOLS, EMINENT Do-
MAIN § 18.4 (3d ed. 1950) ; 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN C. XI
(2d ed. 1953).
255. The appraisal technique is clearly presented in the cases of Louisiana V.
Ragusa, 99 So.2d 20 (La. 1958) and Louisiana v. Sauls, 99 So.2d 97 (La. 1958).
See also School Bd. v. Nassif, 232 La. 218, 94 So.2d 40 (1957) ; Smith v. New
Orleans, 230 La. 282, 88 So.2d 221 (1956) ; Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229
La. 191, 85 So.2d 260 (1956) ; School Board v. Bland, 228 La. 393, 82 So.2d
687 (1955) ; Department of Highways v. Ferris, 227 La. 13, 78 So.2d 493 (1955) ;
Department of Highways v. Glassell, 226 La. 988, 77 So.2d 881 (1955) ; Housing
Authority v. Boudwine, 224 La. 988, 71 So.2d 541 (1954) ; State v. Landry, 219
La. 456, 53 So.2d 232 (1951) ; Harrison v. Highway Comm., 191 La. 839, 186
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appears that as appraisal techniques improve with experience,
the court is tending to rely more and more on expert testimony
as the sole method of determining market value.256 Such increas-
ing reliance seems justified in view of the practical operation of
the real estate market as it exists today in urban areas. As a
practical matter, if one wishes to sell real estate today he con-
sults an agent or expert to sell for him. Basing his price on his
appreciation of the market, the agent greatly influences the out-
ward manifestation of market value-sale price. If this is true,
it follows that the consideration of such an expert's opinion in
the process of valuation will result in "fairer" compensation to
the owner.
Despite earlier assertions adversely reflecting on the reliabil-
ity of evidence of this nature,257 the court has looked upon ex-
pert testimony not only as a general adjustment of other indica-
tions of value, but as being extremely probative of the exact
amount due the owner. The more qualified the witness and the
higher his rank within the real estate field, the more inclined
will be the court to adopt his estimates.258 Generally such testi-
mony is only indicative of market value and is not conclusive, 259
but at times the expert's opinion as to value has been accepted as
controlling.260 In any event it cannot be ignored if it is supported
by the facts relied on by the expert.2 61
So. 354 (1939) ; Shreveport v. Herndon, 173 La. 144, 136 So. 297 (1931) ; New
Orleans v. Moeglich, 169 La. 1111, 126 So. 675 (1930).
256. Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 85 So.2d 260 (1956) ; School
Board v. Willer, 227 La. 201, 78 So.2d 833 (1955) ; Housing Authority v. Boud-
wine, 224 La. 988, 71 So.2d 541 (1954).
257. "[In matters involving opinion only, i.e., judgment, there is always ample
room for honest differences; so that for every Roland brought forward to champion
one side, there will always be found an Oliver to uphold the other .... The province
of an expert is to inform courts and laymen as to the accepted beliefs in their own
line; when they go beyond accepted opinions and express opinions of their own,
they leave the domain of fact and enter upon that of speculation." Mason v. Board
of Levee Comm'rs, 154 La. 995, 98 So. 555 (1923).
258. In Shreveport v. Abe Meyer Corp., 223 La. 1079, 67 So.2d 732 (1953)
the court was quite impressed with the qualifications of a member of the American
Institute of Real Estate Appraisers.
259. Housing Authority v. Gondolfo, 208 La. 1005, 24 So.2d 78 (1945).
260. School Board v. Wilier, 227 La. 201, 78 So.2d 833 (1955).
261. Koerber v. New Orleans, 100 So.2d 461 (La. 1958); Department of
Highways v. Glassell, 226 La. 988, 77 So.2d 881 (1955); Housing Authority v.
Boudwine, 224 La. 988, 71 So.2d 541 (1954) ; State v. Landry, 219 La. 456, 53
So.2d 232 (1951).
Even if it is above the value asked for by the defendant in his answer. Depart-
ment of Highways v. Ferris, 227 La. 13, 78 So.2d 493 (1955). Of. the situation
which was applicable to the jury. Shreveport v. Youree, 114 La. 182, 38 So. 135
(1905) (lower court could not charge jury that they could disregard the testi-
mony if they liked).
But if the witness exaggerates, the court may exclude his testimony complete-
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Averaging. Where efforts have been made by the court to
elicit credible and accurate evidence and testimony as to real
value,262 the product thereby is almost invariably a series of dif-
fering amounts. 268 Fair compensation as a standard would sug-
gest that an impartial adjustment or choice be made where the
probative value of the elements before the court are equal. Under
such circumstances the courts have been inclined to take median
figures from the respective evidence produced by each side and
then average those two figures for an award value. However
mathematical this procedure may seem in a case surrounded
with constitutional connotations, the fact remains that in doing
so the court has adopted an impartial calculation which should
certainly satisfy constitutional requirements. At times the evi-
dence admittedly has been averaged. 2 4 In one case the award
value arrived at was "as a matter of coincidence" the same as an
average of the evidence then before the court.265 In other cases
no mention is made of averaging the evidence, but it appears
that this was done. 26 6
Intrinsic considerations. It has been mentioned that the
market value concept is but an approach to a determination of
the fair compensation which must be awarded to the owner.
Generally three such approaches exist. They are the compara-
tive or market data approach, the reproduction cost approach,
and the capitalization or income approach.267 Where the market
ly and adopt the valuation set by the other party as was the situation in Depart-
ment of Highways v. Chadick, 226 La. 367, 76 So.2d 398 (1954).
262. True value, economic value, utility value. This concept, however it may
be articulated, is useful as a norm or point from which to compare and evaluate
the figures presented for consideration. See WENDT, REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL C. 1
(1956).
263. "Testimony bearing upon the value of the [land taken], as is usual, is
exceedingly conflicting." (Emphasis added.) Highway Comm. v. Merchant, 174 So.
696, 698 (La. App. 1937). "After all, the entire question is very much a matter
of opinion." New Orleans v. Reatz, 162 La. 861, 111 So. 260 (1927).
264. In Louisiana v. Ragusa, 99 So.2d 20 (La. 1958), the court noted that
the plaintiff disapproved of the lower court's averaging out the testimony of each
side, nevertheless this court affirmed and expressly commended the judge a quo.
See Department of Highways v. Ferris, 227 La. 13, 78 So.2d 493 (1955) ; Abney
v. Texarkana, S. & N. R.R., 105 La. 446, 448, 29 So. 890, 891 (1901) ("Ordi-
narily, all of the witnesses being equally credible, an average based upon the esti-
mates of the larger number of witnesses should control") ; Texas & P. Ry. v.
Southern Development Co., 52 La. Ann. 535, 27 So. 101 (1899) (averaging "to
some extent").
265. Shreveport v. Abe Meyer Corp., 223 La. 1079, 67 So.2d 732 (1953).
266. Housing Authority v. Boudwine, 224 La. 988, 71 So.2d 541 (1954);
Housing Authority v. Brinkman, 224 La. 262, 69 So.2d 37 (1953).
267. These are the three accepted appraisal approaches. In the real estate
field, generally valuations are made with consideration given to each approach
where possible. See SCHMUTZ, CONDEMNATION APPRAISAL HANDBOOK 7 et seq.
(1938) ; WENDT, REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL 49 (1956).
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data approach cannot be used due to a lack of or conflicting evi-
dence, resort is made to the latter methods.2 68 However, even in
situations where the market approach is employed, items relative
to the other two methods may also be utilized. Where resort is
made to the latter approaches the court may say reference is
being made to "intrinsic" value.2 6 9 This means that the valuation
considerations will be more subjective and relate to the subject
property itself rather than involve considerations of objective
market data.
The reproduction cost approach is useful where the subject
property contains immovable improvements, but the comparative
data before the court is relative to other unimproved properties.
Such data may be used with an allowance made for the improve-
ment on the basis of reproduction cost. However, this approach
is most valid when the improvements are new. If they are aged,
original cost,270 or bare reproduction cost 271 cannot be employed
without making an adjustment for depreciation. 272
The income approach27 is often found used as a check on the
market approach. Thus it is said to aid only in the determina-
tion of market value but is not conclusive.2 7 4 The income used
should be that income produced by the property and not profit
attributable to the business conducted therein.275 It should be
268. Which is exactly what was done in Department of Highways v. Ferris,
227 La. 13, 78 So.2d 493 (1955). See New Orleans v. Noto, 217 La. 657, 47 So.2d
36 (1950) ; Housing Authority v. Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So.2d 295 (1942) ; Kansas
City S. & G. Ry. v. Smith's Heirs, 51 La. Ann. 1079, 25 So. 955 (1899).
269. Housing Authority v. Boudwine, 224 La. 988, 71 So.2d 541 (1954)
Housing Authority v. Brinkman, 224 La. 262, 69 So.2d 37 (1953) ; Housing Au-
thority v. Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So.2d 295 (1942) ; Orleans & J. Ry. v. Jefferson
& L.P. Ry., 51 La. Ann. 1605, 26 So. 278 (1899).
270. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Louisiana Western R.R., 49 La. Ann. 1270, 22
So. 219 (1897) (however, reasonable remuneration was to be allowed).
271. Department of Highways v. Chadick, 226 La. 367, 76 So.2d 398 (1954).
But cf. State v. Landry, 219 La. 456, 53 So.2d 232 (1951) ; Housing Authority v.
Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So.2d 295 (1942).
272. School Board v. Nassif, 232 La. 218, 94 So.2d 40 (1957) ; Texas Pac.-
Missouri Pac. Terminal R.R. v. Rouprich, 166 La. 344, 117 So. 273 (1928).
273. Generally rental income is involved.
274. Louisiana v. Sauls, 99 So.2d 97 (La. 1958) ; School Board v. Nassif, 232
La. 218, 94 So.2d 40 (1957); Mississippi River Bridge Authority v. Curry, 232
La. 140, 94 So.2d 9 (1957); Housing Authority v. Boudwine, 224 La. 988, 71
So.2d 541 (1954) ; Highway Comm. v. Paciera, 205 La. 784, 18 So.2d 193 (1944) ;
Housing Authority v. Persson, 203 La. 255, 13 So.2d 853 (1943) ; Morgan's Lou-
isiana & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. John T. Moore Planting Co., 130 La. 78, 57 So. 635(1912). But cf. Britt v. Shreveport, 83 So.2d 476 (La. App. 1955) (lower court
reasoned that since rental income had not been reduced, market value had not been
impaired by the city's action and appeal court said while it did not entirely agree
with the court a quo it would affirm,).
275. Highway Comm. v. Paciera, 205 La. 784, 18 So.2d 193 (1944) ; Housing
Authority v. Persson, 203 La. 255, 13 So.2d 853 (1943). But of. Louisiana v.
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present 276 net income 77 and not income which may be expected
in the future.278 When an acceptable income figure is reached,
it may be capitalized to obtain an estimate of value or it may be
used to adjust the figure reached by the market value approach.
Time of valuation. There are three general situations pre-
senting the problem of determination of the time at which valua-
tion should be made and in each the point of time is different.
These situations are the three situations involving rules ap-
plicable to eminent domain: the formal expropriation suit,279 the
St. Julien situation,280 and the case where there is no physical
taking but only a damaging within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion.28 1 In the first it has been held that the valuation must be
at the date on which the suit for expropriation is filed.28 2 This
is the point in time at which the taker seeks to exercise his power
of expropriation. In the last situation, that of a damaging with
no physical acquisition, the method in which compensation or
damage is calculated dictates the point in time which must be
used. There recovery is for the difference in the market value
of the property immediately before and after the injury. 2 3 The
St. Julien situation, however, presents three possible choices.
One may be the time at which the taker moves onto the prop-
erty.284 Since an injunction is available to the owner to eject
Sauls, 99 So.2d 97 (La. 1958). In this matter see JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN § 150
(1953).
276. Not anticipated income. Highway Comm. v. Paciera, 205 La. 784, 18 So.2d
193 (1944).
277. Not gross income. Housing Authority v. Boudwine, 224 La. 988, 71 So.2d
541 (1954).
278. This is because it is too speculative, but even so adjustment may be made
in the capitalization figure used and this applies as well where gross income is used.
See JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN § 147 (1953).
279. See page 528 supra.
280. See page 533 supra.
281. See page 536 supra.
282. Department of Highways v. Chadick, 226 La. 367, 76 So.2d 398 (1954)
Texas Pac.-Missouri Pac. Terminal R.R. v. Elliott, 166 La. 347, 117 So. 275
(1928) ; Louisville & N. R.R. v. R. E. E. DeMontluzin Co., 166 La. 211, 116 So.
854 (1928) ; New Orleans Ry. & Light Co. v. Lavergne, 138 La. 949, 70 So. 921
(1916) ; Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Sarpy, 125 La. .388, 51 So. 433 (1910) ;
Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Xavier Realty Co., 115 La. 328, 39 So. 1 (1905). Cf.
Shreveport v. Abe Meyer Corp., 219 La. 128, 52 So.2d 445 (1951) (time of the
taking) ; Housing Authority v. Gondolfo, 208 La. 1065, 24 So.2d 78 (1945) (court
a quo charged "today") ; Opelousas G. & N.E. Ry. v. St. Landry Cotton Oil Co.,
118 La. 290, 42 So. 940 (1907) (when taker demands property and offers to make
payment).
283. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Maguire, 219 La. 740, 54 So.2d 4 (1951). In
a footnote the court terms this "well settled jurisprudence."
284. As was done in New Orleans Land Co. v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 171
La. 718, 132 So. 1.21 (1930) ; Brittingham v. Board of Drainage Comm'rs, 167
La. 368, 119 So. 259 (1928) ; Jacobs v. Kansas City, S. & G. Ry., 134 La. 389, 64
So. 150 (1914) ; Pons v. Yazoo & M.V. R.R., 131 La. 313, 59 So. 721 (1912).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the taker if he acts within a reasonable time and before the taker
has erected any constructions, the deprivations of the owner are
not concluded by the mere fact of acquisition in this situation.
Thus the owner has not lost anything for which he should re-
ceive value. The time at which constructions are completed to
such an extent as to prevent an injunction and relegate the
owner to a claim only for land taken and damages is very in-
definite and would probably be unworkable as a valuation time
point. The other choice then is the time at which suit is brought
by the owner for compensation. In Koerber v. New Orleans285
the city by mistake moved onto the plaintiff's property in 1941
and began construction of an airport. Plaintiff non-judicially
asserted ownership claims in 1947 and instituted suit in 1949;
defendant answered in 1951. Reversing the court of appeal286
which had made the valuation as of 1941, the Supreme Court
held28 T that the valuation should have been made at the time
when there was an exercise of the power of eminent domain,
which occurred in 1951 when the defendant answered. Not-
withstanding this clear and apparently equitable holding, it must
be said that in the prior cases where it was clear that the taker
entered without proceedings, the result reached in the appeal
court and championed by the dissenters in the Supreme Court
prevailed.288 It is submitted that the better time point of valua-
tion is the time when the owner judicially asserts his demand.
Otherwise at his choice under the Koerber holding, the taker
may delay in answering in the situation of a falling market and
thus cause a lower compensation to be awarded to the owner.
If the taker wishes to select the time of valuation, it should
be made to proceed via an expropriation suit where valuation is
made as of the date of filing.28 9 If the acquisition by the taker
under the special highway procedures2 90 moves to suit, the time
of valuation is that time when the estimated compensation was
deposited in the registry of the court.2 1
Future uses. Although all valuation considerations are re-
lated to a point in time previous to that when the valuation is
made, there is one item that must relate to the future and temper
285. 228 La. 903, 84 So.2d 454 (1955). Under the St. Julien rule plaintiff's
remedy was restricted to recovery of the land taken and not its possession.
286. Which had reversed the district court's holding that the time of valuation
should be the date of defendant's answer. 76 So.2d 466 (La. App. 1954).
287. Justices Hawthorne and McCaleb dissenting.
288. See cases cited note 284 supra.
289. See note 282 supra.
290. See p. 524 8upra.
291. LA. R.S. 48:453 (1950).
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all valuation considerations. Suppose owner X has farm land
situated next to an expanding subdivision. When that land is
expropriated, should it be valued as farm land or possible sub-
division land ?292 After some contrary assertions, 293 the rule now
appears to be that such land may be valued in light of the pos-
sible uses to which it may reasonably have been subject in the
future. 29 4 Such future use cannot be remote2 5 nor speculative, 296
and must be not only possible,2 97 but probable. 29 8 The value of
the land in light of its actual future use299 - the use to which
the taker will apply it -cannot be considered. 00 Further, any
increment in value resulting from the proposed301 use of the taker
or from any improvements he may have constructed on the sub-
ject property30 2 must be excluded. But increments of value due
to improvements proposed by third parties may be considered.
Danages
Consequential or severance damages. The foregoing analysis
292. In Highway Comm. v. DeBouchel, 174 La. 968, 142 So. 142 (1932), the
court said the farm land taken would have no value as agricultural land and so
residential purposes would be considered.
293. E.g., that made in Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Baton Rouge Brickyard,
136 La. 833, 67 So. 922 (1915).
294. See Koerber v. New Orleans, 100 So.2d 461 (La. 1958) ; Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. Simmons, 229 La. 165, 85 So.2d 251 (1956); School Board v.
Bland, 228 La. 393, 82 So.2d 687 (1955) ; School Board v. Willer, 227 La. 201, 78
So.2d 833 (1955) ; Shreveport v. Abe Meyer Corp., 219 La. 128, 52 So.2d 445
(1951) ; Highway Comm. v. Grey, 197 La. 942, 2 So.2d 654 (1941).
295. See School Board v. Miller, 222 La. 584, 63 So.2d 6 (1953) ; Housing
Authority v. Harkey, 200 La. 526, 8 So.2d 528 (1942).
296. See New Orleans v. Moeglich, 169 La. 1111, 126 So. 675 (1930) ; Louis-
ville & N. R.R. v. R. E. E. DeMontluzin Co., 166 La. 211, 116 So. 854 (1928).
297. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Maguire, 219 La. 740, 54 So.2d 4 (1951).
298. School Board v. Miller, 222 La. 584, 63 So.2d 6 (1953).
299. Contention is generally made for consideration of future residential use,
but industrial as well as commercial uses may also be urged. See Texas Pipe Line
Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 85 So.2d 260 (1956) (industrial) ; Highway Comm.
v. Paciera, 205 La. 784, 18 So.2d 193 (1944) (commercial); Highway Comm. v.
Lasseigne, 177 La. 440, 148 So. 672 (1933) (industrial); Highway Comm. v.
Ferguson, 176 La. 642, 146 So. 319 (1933) (same).
300. Since this would not be market value, but rather value to the taker which
is not allowed. 1 OROEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 81 (2d ed.
1953). But ef. Orleans & J. Ry. v. Jefferson & L.P. Ry., 51 La. Ann. 1605, 26 So.
278 (1899).
301. "In estimating the value of the property to be expropriated, the basis of
assessment shall be the true value which the land possessed before the contem-
plated improvement was proposed." (Emphasis added.) LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2633
(1870). Some attempt was offered to distinguish between increments produced by
proposed improvements and those which were merely contemplated, allowing re-
covery only for the latter. Shreveport Traction Co. v. Svara, 133 La. 900,63 So. 396
(1913). But that difference has not been generally followed. Department of High-
ways v. Chadick, 226 La. 367, 76 So.2d 398 (1954) (increase due to contemplated
improvements is to be excluded).
302. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co. v. Lavergne, 138 La. 949, 70 So. 921
(1916) ; New Orleans, Opelousas & G.W. Ry. v. Lagarde, 10 La. Ann. 150 (1855).
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of valuation has assumed that the taker has acquired the owner's
property in its entirety. Seldom is this true in fact, however,
and the taker may acquire only a segment or portion of the
physical property, or merely a servitude. 08 Such acquisition "by
pieces" injures the remaining property, inflicting "consequen-
tial" or "severance 80 4 damages on the owner. If the compensa-
tion to which he is entitled were limited to merely the market
value of the property acquired, great injustice would result.
Thus it is a well-established rule that in cases of partial-
takings, 0 damages resulting to the residuum of the property
by reason of the acquisition are compensable. 0 6 This is sound
in theory for the economic value of property is not evenly dis-
tributed through the entire tract,30 7 and the value of a section
of a tract to that tract may be more than that section's pro-
portional per area share of the total value of the entire tract.
This increment is due to such considerations as plottage value 08
or location advantages. The valuation of the loss of this incre-
ment in a partial taking case may be approached in two ways. 0 9
One is to consider it as "damage" to the residuum property.
There the total award value is determined by combining the
value of that part taken, with the damages accruing to the re-
maining property. The other method is to consider the differ-
ence between the market value of the property before and after
the partial taking as encompassing all considerations in one item.
Employment of either the "damages plus" rule as opposed to the
303. It should be noticed that in the valuation area of expropriation, the courts
make no distinction between the servitude and perfect ownership if the owner's
rights are considerably interfered with. Thus if the term partial taking is used it
may as well refer to the taking of a servitude. See note 62 supra.
304. Nichols would draw a distinction between the terms consequential dam-
ages and severance damages, the latter relating strictly to those damages resulting
to the residuum. However, the Louisiana courts do not make this distinction and
neither do most authorities. 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.1(3) (3d ed.
1950).
305. See note 303 supra.
306. JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN § 98 (1953); 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 14.2 (3d ed. 1950); 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN C. IV (2d
ed. 1953).
307. Green v. Board of Lake Comm'rs, 163 La. 117, 11 So. 619 (1927) ("it is
not a matter of mere arithmetic").
308. "An increment of value arising as a consequence of the combining of two
or more sites so as to develop one site having a greater utility than the aggregate
of each when separately considered." APPRAISAL TERMINOLOGY AND HANDBOOK
119 (1950).
309. Three methods are generally recited: (1) damages to the remainder in-
cluded in the value of the part taken; (2) value of the part taken plus damages
to the remainder; and (3) difference between the fair market value of the prop-
erty before and after the taking. The first two have little real appreciable prac-
tical difference between them. See JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN § 98 (1952) ; 1 ORGEL,
VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 48 (2d ed. 1953).
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"before and after" rule may cause certain procedural and tech-
nical differences to result,8 10 but generally the valuation result
should be the same in either case.
Louisiana apparently employed the damages rule at times,311
but in the case of Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barb e,812 the Supreme
Court on second rehearing clearly adopted the "before and after"
rule as the proper method of treating severance damages.
The fact that a taker may later tortiously injure the owner
while using the acquired portion cannot be considered as an
item affecting valuation.318 But if the taker's proposed use is
such as to inspire fear, however unreasonable, in prospective
buyers of the residuum, the deflating effect of such fear on the
market value of the remainder may be considered.
31 4
The taker is also liable to the owner for those expenses in-
curred in adjusting the estate to the occupation of the taker 315
and for the depressionary effect that the inconvenience caused
by the taker has on the market value of the property.816 Although
the transfer of property in an expropriation suit is not a con-
tract,817 affirmative duties may be imposed on the taker,3 18 and
mandamus may issue to achieve compliance.
19
310. E.g., place burden of proof on owner to establish damages if the former
rule is applied. Highway Comm. v. Ferguson, 176 La. 642, 146 So. 319 (1933)
(they will not be presumed).
311. See Highway Comm. v. Ferguson, 176 La. 642, 146 So. 319 (1933) ; Louis-
ville & N. R.R. v. R. E. E. DeMontluzin, 166 La. 211, 116 So. 854 (1928) ; Lou-
isiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Xavier Realty Co., 115 La. 328, 39 So. 1 (1905). Con-
sidered as a damaging, the Constitution Article 1, § 2, is in point.
312. 229 La. 191, 85 So.2d 260 (1956). See Police Jury v. Hernandez, 232
La. 1, 93 So.2d 672 (1957) (affirming the rule).
313. E.g., Commercial Tel. Cable Co. v. Prevost, 133 La. 47, 62 So. 347 (1913).
See note 198 supra.
314. Texas Pipe Line Co. v. National Gasoline Co., 203 La. 787, 14 So.2d 636(1943). See also Kansas City S. & G. Ry. v. Roberts, 49 La. Ann. 859, 21 So.
630 (1897).
315. Department of Highways v. Laird, 219 La. 567, 53 So.2d 674 (1951)
(moving buildings back on land, extending electrical wiring, rearranging fences) ;
Public Belt R.R. Comm. v. Atkinson, 180 La. 992, 158 So. 363 (1935) (reconstruc-
tion of roadway) ; Highway Comm. v. Hoell, 174 La. 302, 140 So. 485 (1932)(rearranging houses, constructing fences) ; New Orleans Pac. Ry. v. Murrell, 36
La. Ann. 344 (1884) (rearranging headlines, bridges, etc.).
316. See Highway Comm. v. Hoell, 174 La. 302, 140 So. 485 (1932) ; Colorado
So. N.O. & P. R.R. v. Boagni, 118 La. 268, 42 So. 932 (1907).
317. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co. v. Lavergne, 138 La. 949, 70 So. 921
(1916) ; State ex -el. Boagni v. Colorado So. N.O. & P.R.R., 120 La. 9, 44 So.
905 (1907).
318. Taylor v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 126 La. 420, 52 So. 562 (1910)
Colorado So. N.O. & P.R.R. v. Boagni, 118 La. 268, 42 So. 932 (1907) ; Kansas
City S. & G. Ry. v. Louisiana W.R.Co., 116 La. 178, 40 So. 627 (1905).
319. State ex tel. Boagni v. Colorado So. N.C. & P. R.R., 120 La. 9, 44 So.
905 (1907).
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Benefit set-off. In a partial taking320 case the increment
accruing to the residual property of the owner caused by the
improvements which the taker erects on the subject property
may at times be offset against the amount due the owner. This
is the concept of benefit set-off.821 Article 2633 of the Civil Code
of 1870822 prohibits the application of the concept, but subsequ-nt
cases have drawn the distinction, common in other jurisdic-
tions,3 23 between those benefits which are "general" to the com-
munity and those which are "special" to the subject property,
allowing only the latter to be offset. 324 Further refinements of
the concept have been made in that the benefits may only be off-
set to the extent that the residual property is "damaged" and
may not be further used to decrease the amount determined due
for the value of the subject property acquired.325 The concept
apparently prevails despite the fact that argument has been
made that benefit offset is unconstitutional,3 26 speculative,3 27 and
double deprivation828 to the owner in that he may also later be
taxed for the added benefit accruing to the remaining property.
Incidental damages. In the situation of a total taking the
owner is reimbursed for the property interests taken and dam-
aged. His injury, however, does not end there, especially if he
has been in active possession of the subject property. In leaving
320. In those cases falling under LA. CONST. art. I, § 2, benefit offset is in-
herent in the method of computation and does not need to be specifically con-
sidered, contrary to the rationale set forth in Britt v. Shreveport, 83 So.2d 476
(La. App. 1955). See LA. R.S. 33:3742 (1950). Cf. Manning v. Shreveport, 119
La. 1044, 44 So. 882 (1907).
321. See JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN C. XV (1953) ; 1 OROEL, VALUATION UNDER
EMINENT DOMAIN c. VIII (2d ed. 1953).
322. This article was not in the previous codes and benefits were set off.
Vicksburg, Shreveport & Texas R.R. v. Calderwood, 15 La. Ann. 481 (1860);
New Orleans, Opelousas & G.W. R.R. v. Lagarde, 10 La. Ann. 150 (1855) ; In re
Euphrosine Street, 7 La. Ann. 72 (1852) ; Dussuau v. Municipality Number One,
6 La. Ann. 575 (1851).
323. See note 321 supra.
324. The distinction is clearly made in Highway Comm. v. Grey, 197 La. 942,
2 So.2d 654 (1941) ; Highway Comm. v. Hoell, 174 La. 302, 140 So. 485 (1932).
See also New Orleans v. Noto, 217 La. 657, 47 So.2d 36 (1950) ; Shreveport Trac-
tion Co. v. Svara, 133 La. 900, 63 So. 396 (1913). But of. N.O. Pacific Ry. v.
Gay, 31 La. Ann. 430 (1879).
325. E.g., East Baton Rouge Parish Council v. Koller, 94 So.2d 505, 507n.
(La. App. 1957).
326. Justice Slidell, dissenting in In re Euphrosine Street, 7 La. Ann. 72
(1852).
327. Ibid., answered in Vicksburg, Shreveport & Texas R.R. v. Calderwood, 15
La. Ann. 481 (1860) (if such improvements are "speculative" so is the main
valuation).
328. Brittingham v. Board of Drainage Comm'rs, 167 La. 368, 119 So. 259
(1928) ; Shreveport Trnction Co. v. Svara, 133 La. 900, 63 So. 396 (1913) (but
in reference to "general" benefits).
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it he suffers inconvenience 82 9 and sentimental loss ;830 he loses
business and good will ;331 and he incurs expenses in moving. 82
All such losses, termed incidental or merely consequential, are
generally denied consideration and the taker is not required to
compensate the owner for them. This refusal is for two reasons:
such losses are speculative and the taker is not acquiring what
the owner has lost.83 8 Vigorous opposition has been leveled at
the doctrine884 and, since such losses which the owner suffers in
this area are likely to be as real as any other loss, reconsidera-
tion of the doctrine denying recovery for incidental losses seems
to be in order.
Interests and Costs
In an expropriation suit the owner is subject to expenses and
deprivations other than those heretofore mentioned. It appears
that upon notice that his property is sought by a taker, the owner
is restricted in his use of his property.88 5 Any improvements he
erects after knowledge that his property is to be taken may be
excluded from consideration in the award.38 If the taker is ac-
quiring the property because of certain special attributes it pos-
sesses the owner may be enjoined from altering them.837 In order
to satisfy constitutional requirements, interest must therefore be
paid on the award.8 8 The point at which interest starts to run
329. But if the inconvenience suffered in a partial-taking case lowers the
market value of the remaining land, it may be considered. Highway Comm. v.
Guidry, 176 La. 389, 146 So. 1 (1933) ; Highway Comm. v. Hoell, 174 La. 302,
140 So. 485 (1932).
330. Or mental suffering: Nagle v. Police Jury, 175 La. 704, 144 So. 425
(1932) ; Highway Comm. v. DeBouchell, 174 La. 968, 142 So. 142 (1932).
331. Housing Authority v. Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So.2d 295 (1942) (loss of
profit from music pupils termed speculative, refused) ; Opelousas Gulf & N.E.
Ry. v. St. Landry Cotton Oil Co., 121 La. 796, 46 So. 810 (1908) (loss of busi-
ness, etc., is "mere consequential" loss, refused). But cf. Department of High-
ways v. Laird, 219 La. 567, 53 So.2d 674 (1951) (lower court allowed recovery;
Supreme Court held such "consequential losses" not being proved cannot be al-
lowed).
332. School Board v. Nassif, 232 La. 218, 94 So.2d 40 (1957) ; Department of
Highways v. Ferris, 227 La. 13, 78 So.2d 493 (1955). But cf. Housing Authority
v. Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So.2d 295 (1942) (moving costs refused because not sup-
ported by satisfactory evidence).
333. JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN 155 (1953).
334. By an excellent, well-supported Comment, 26 YALE L.J. 61 (1957).
335. State ex rel. New Orleans v. Ellis, 113 La. 555, 37 So. 209 (1904).
336. See Department of Highways v. Laird, 219 La. 567, 53 So.2d 674 (1951)
(formal expropriation suit) ; Manning v. Shreveport, 119 La. 1044, 44 So. 882
(1907) (constitutional damaging). But he cannot be enjoined from making them.
State ex rel. New Orleans v. Ellis, 113 La. 555, 37 So. 209 (1904).
337. State ex rel. New Orleans v. Ellis, 113 La. 555, 37 So. 209 (1904).
338. See the correct dictum in l-amberlin v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
210 La. 483, 27 So.2d 307 (1946), which covers this at length.
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in the situations of a formal expropriation suit 39 and a constitu-
tional damaging840 is the date when judicial demand is made in
the suit in which the award is made. 341 There is some authority
to the effect that in the St. Julien situation interest runs from
the date of occupancy, 42 but it too seems to be subject to the
judicial demand rule.3 43
The taker must pay the costs of trial344 unless he has made a
prior tender of true value to the owner.345 This rule does not
apply, and the costs fall on him, if the owner demands an exorbi-
tant price, 346 or refuses to negotiate. 47 At the appellate level, the
rule must obviously be different and there the unsuccessful party
incurs the costs. 348 True value is strictly viewed here, and a
tender sufficient to overcome the exception of prematurity4 9
may not be sufficient to shift the costs to the owners. 8
339. Gravity Drainage District v. Key, 99 So.2d 82 (La. 1958) ; Shreveport &
Arkansas By. v. Hollingsworth, 42 La. Ann. 749, 7 So. 693 (1890). Cf. Westwego
Canal & Terminal Co. v. Highway Comm., 200 La. 990, 9 So.2d 389 (1942)
(question of whether interest was due from judicial demand or from date of judg-
ment was foreclosed by the judgment awarding it from judicial demand) ; New
Orleans v. New Orleans Land Co., 173 La. 71, 136 So. 91 (1931) (it is not from
lis pendens).
340. Harrison v. Highway Comm., 202 La. 345, 11 So.2d 612 (1942) (judicial
demand is date of filing).
341. Ibid. One suit was filed, abandoned. Second suit was filed and carried to
a conclusion. Interest allowed from time of filing of the second suit.
342. Jacobs v. Kansas City, S. & G. By., 134 La. 389, 64 So. 150 (1914)
(from time of entry); Lawrence v. The Second Municipality, 2 La. Ann. 651
(1847) (from time of taking possession).
343. Gay v. New Orleans Pac. Ry., 32 La. Ann. 274 (1880). See Cousin v.
Hornsby, 87 So.2d 157 (La. App. 1956).
344. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2638 (1870). Even though it is the state. Housing
Authority v. Polmer, 231 La. 452, 91 So.2d 600 (1956).
345. Ibid. In such case the owner should be allowed at least the amount of
such tender. Louisiana & A. By. v. Moseley, 117 La. 313, 41 So. 585 (1906).
346. Highway Comm. v. Bullis, 197 La. 14, 200 So. 805 (1941).
347. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Maguire, 219 La. 740, 54 So.2d 4 (1951).
348. See Morgan's Louisiana & T. R.R. & S.S. Co. v. Barton, 51 La. Ann.
1338, 26 So. 271 (1899).
349. Under the rule of Calcasieu & So. Ry. v. Witte, 224 La. 1091, 71 So.2d
854 (1954).
350. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Dileo, 79 So.2d 150 (La. App. 1955)
(exception of prematurity was waived by delay in answering). There are here
assertions that may alter this entire paragraph. Here the court would have re-
quired a tender of true value in a bona fide effort to settle without suit even
though such effort would be of no avail. The exceptions established by the Su-
preme Court, listed at notes 346, 347 supra, do not fully support such a position.
See Calcasieu & S. By. v. Kinder Canal Co., 69 So.2d 537 (La. App. 1954) (con-
ceding taker made no offer, owner's refusal to negotiate waived any exception of
prematurity, but inadequate offer did not shift costs). See also Shreveport v.
Kansas City, S. & G. Ry., 184 La. 473, 166 So. 471 (1936), where the issue was
ability to sue. Inasmuch as the requirement of previous tender as a condition to
suit is waived where denial is made of the taker's right to expropriate, it may also
follow that costs shift. Indications, however, are that less effort will be required
on the part of the taker to avoid the prematurity rule than is needed to shift costs.
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Conclusion
The court has evidenced a general tendency to view expro-
priation not so much as a taking of corporeal property as a situa-
tion involving injury to an owner through a destruction of his
rights which he holds in relation to his property.3 51
Apart from the differences relative to forced sales and assess-
ment value, Louisiana is generally in line with other jurisdictions
on matters of eminent domain. The litigation has come about
for the most part in simple factual situations. Thus the extensive
judicial refinement and elaboration of rules which is found in
certain other states is not found in Louisiana. The existing rules
are, however, quite practically workable and generally sufficient.
Joseph G. Hebert
Conflict of Laws -Rules on Marital Property
"Marital property" means the interests which arise in one
spouse, with respect to things owned or acquired by the other
spouse, solely by virtue of the marriage relation. Though each
of the United States has its own particular set of laws govern-
ing marital property, the systems of marital property law of our
country may be considered as belonging to one or the other of
two greatly different categories: separate property states form
one category; community property states the other. The present
ease of transportation coupled with the constant growth of our
country provide an ever-increasing volume of choice of law prob-
lems concerning the divergencies of these two systems.
Conflict of laws rules arise because different jurisdictions
have different laws; when operative facts of a case involve two
or more jurisdictions, the laws of which differ on the point at
issue, the forum must make a choice of law. The forum which
undertakes this choice does so in pursuance of certain policies.
Five of the most important policy considerations have been listed
as:
"1. Policy in favor of treating the estate of the spouses as
a unit with all elements of it governed by the same rules.
351. Property may be looked on as corporeal property or as a "bundle of rights."
Two interesting articles dealing with the concept of property are Bowen, The Con-
cept of Private Property, 11 CoRN. L.Q. 41 (1925) ; Cormack, Legal Concepts in
Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALEi L.J. 221 (1931).
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